Summum

[Rick Duncan]

I agree with Doug that unlike political issues, "we don't need to vote to determine what religion we are."
 
But much govt speech is not about political issues and elections. A lot of government speech "endorsing" religion has to do with govt recognizing religious holidays and recognizing religious cultural subgroups in the community or as part of the community's history.

If the EC endorsement test only prohibited government speech taking an official position on religious doctrines such as the doctrine of election or the divinity of Christ, I would not be too concerned (although I might still wonder how anyone has a liberty interest to justify such a claim under the incorporated EC). And frankly, the political process is almost always a sufficient check on govt endorsing specific religious doctrines.

But, of course, much govt religious speech is of the cultural type--Christmas displays or Ten Commandment displays and the like. In other words, it is not about elections, but about recognizing we are a nation of many different communities with many different cultures, including religious subgroups and religious cultures, and religious history.

Religious subgroups are part of the culture as well--if a public school may celebrate Gay Pride Week and Black History Month and Earth Day and Cinco de Mayo, there is no reason to forbid it from recognizing Christmas. Those who are offended by any of these displays can avert their eyes. There is no liberty to silence govt speech recognizing religious holidays and religious subgroups as part of a pluralistic community. 

Liberty is best served by protecting the right of the govt to recognize that religion is part of the culture and by protecting the right to receive govt speech of those who wish to view religious displays as part of the govt's recognition of our culture and pluralism. The heckler's veto created by the endorsement test is a liberty-restricting, not a liberty-protecting, interest. It is a right to control what kind of govt expression a willing audience can view, even though the only burden on the Pl is the burden of averting the eye.

This is the kind of issue I love discussing in class. And my students understand that the solution is not as simple as saying that religious speech is different from secular speech under the First Amendment. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn't.


Rick Duncan 
Welpton Professor of Law 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902


"Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting 
the vote."--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of Franklin)

"It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start doubting His existence."  --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of Conscience)     "Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the perversion of the best is the worst." -- Id.

--- On Thu, 3/26/09, Douglas Laycock <laycockd at umich.edu> wrote:

From: Douglas Laycock <laycockd at umich.edu>
Subject: RE: Summum
To: religionlaw at lists.ucla.edu
Date: Thursday, March 26, 2009, 2:44 PM


-----Inline Attachment Follows-----

Actually, I raised Rick's question in class today.  Not with respect to Summum, which we haven't gotten to yet, but with respect to the difference between the remedy in Barnette and the remedy in Engel and Schempp.  Students pretty quickly decided that government couldn't govern if it couldn't try to influence public opinion on political issues.  Political issues require a collective decision; we debate and lobby and hold elections and eventually, the people or their elected representatives vote.
  There is no need for a collective decision on religion.  We don't have to vote to determine what religion we are; we can be a lot of different religions.  Election campaigns and voting about what religion we really are would be a wholly unnecessary source of conflict.  And letting the self-presumed majority, or noisiest minority, seize control of the government's religion without a vote is no better.  
  We protect individual liberty by maximizing individual choice, and with respect to religion, there is no reason to limit individual choice even to the extent of permitting government persuasion -- or government propaganda.
  Quoting Rick Duncan <nebraskalawprof at yahoo.com>:

> I appreciate Alan's many good points about the EC. Of course, we all 
> discuss all of these points when we cover the EC in our classes.
>
> My post about Alito's opinion in Summam--in which he describes the 
> government's ability to choose its own message and its own viewpoints 
> as essential to the conduct of government--and then says oh, but 
> religious speech by government is different, raises a different issue 
> which I think also deserves discussion in the classroom.
>
> Certainly, religious equality is important, but so is cultural 
> equality and political equality.
>
> Imagine two passive displays in a public school--one is a nativity 
> scene recognizing the fact that many in the community are celebrating 
> Christmas, and the other is a gay pride display which says "support 
> gay equality and stop homophobia."
>
> Both of these displays are challenged by students who find them 
> offensive--the nativity display by  student A who is offended by the  
> schools "endorsement of religion" and the gay pride display by 
> student B, a conservative Christian who is offended by the school's 
> endorsement of the message that his religious belief about human 
> sexuality is wrong and must be "stopped."
>
> Many of you would agree with Justice Alito that the government has a 
> right to take a position denouncing "homophobia" and that we would 
> deny an essential part of government's power if we allow student B a 
> heckler's veto enjoining the government's right to express its 
> message. So long as the government does not coerce student B into 
> affirming his support for the government's viewpoint, his remedy is 
> to avert his eye rather than to silence the government and those who 
> wish to receive the government's message about gay rights.
>
> But not so with student A and his objection to the Christmas display. 
> Even though his liberty is in no way deprived by a passive display 
> recognizing a religious holiday being celebrated by many in the 
> community, he has the right to censor government speech endorsing 
> religion. Suddenly, government speech is not so essential and is 
> subject to a heckler's veto by anyone who takes offense.
>
> If Alito is right and the essence of government is to speak out and 
> take the viewpoints of its choice on issues that come up in the 
> marketplace of ideas, why should the EC be interpreted as protecting 
> a non-liberty interest of hecklers to censor religious viewpoints 
> expressed by state and local governments?
>
> Because student A feels like an outsider as a result of the state's 
> nativity display? But doesn't student B, the religious "homophobe," 
> feel even more like an unwanted outsider when the state endorse the 
> gay pride display and the message that "homophobia" such as his 
> religious beliefs must be stopped?
>
> We all cover the issues Alan raises. But I suspect many of us do not 
> point out the contrast between those offended by the government's 
> secular speech and those offended by the government's religious 
> speech. And even if you accept that the EC is properly incorporated 
> as a "liberty" interest under the 14th Amendment, what explains the 
> Court's many cases protecting non-liberty claims under the 
> judicially-created endorsement test. The endorsement test is a 
> structural test, not a liberty-protecting test.
>
> I think it makes teaching the EC far more interesting when you ask 
> some of these hard questions about the endorsement test as applied 
> via incorporation to the states, and point out the contrast between 
> what Alito's says about government speech in general and what he says 
> only a sentence or two later about the EC as a limitation on the 
> government's power to choose its messages.
>
>
>
> Rick Duncan
> Welpton Professor of Law
> University of Nebraska College of Law
> Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
>
>
> "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. 
> Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting
> the vote."--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of 
> Franklin)
>
> "It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's 
> existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start 
> doubting His existence."  --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of 
> Conscience)     "Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the 
> perversion of the best is the worst." -- Id.
>
> --- On Thu, 3/26/09, Brownstein, Alan <aebrownstein at ucdavis.edu> wrote:
>
> From: Brownstein, Alan <aebrownstein at ucdavis.edu>
> Subject: RE: Summum
> To: "Law & Religion issues for Law Academics" <religionlaw at lists.ucla.edu>
> Date: Thursday, March 26, 2009, 10:29 AM
>
> Just a few quick points.
>
> 1. There is nothing in Justice Alito's comments that limit his 
> remarks about government speech to "passive" government speech. 
> Government can say what it wants to say actively or passively. If 
> government has unlimited discretion in communicating its own messages 
> and that power is not limited by the Establishment Clause, why can't 
> government proselytize in favor of particular faiths.
>
> 2. You could substitute spending for speech in most of Alito's 
> comments. Government has tremendous discretion in deciding how it 
> will spend its money. This power is not limited by the Free Speech 
> Clause. But many of us would argue that the Establishment Clause 
> constrains the government's power to subsidize the religious 
> activities of particular faiths and not others.
>
> 3. Government may express passive messages in places other than 
> public property. Suppose the government purchased a large cross and 
> requested permission to locate it on the grounds of a particular 
> church that it favored. Would that violate the Establishment Clause? 
> If the government can single out a particular faith community's 
> religious message and adopt it as its own and dedicate public 
> property as the site for the communication of that message -- all in 
> the name of unrestricted government speech -- why can't the 
> government create its own religious display and exhibit it on private 
> property that it selects (with the owner's permission)?
>
> 4. While I certainly appreciate the argument that government attempts 
> to influence the religious beliefs of the community through 
> government speech implicate religious liberty interests, I would have 
> thought that the obvious value at issue in the Summum case was 
> religious equality. The government adopts the religious message of 
> one faith community and rejects the religious message of a different 
> faith community. The analogy here would be a city that adopts 
> religious displays to celebrate Christian holidays, but refuses to 
> accept displays celebrating the holidays of other faith communities. 
> The question raised by Summum that the Court alluded to -- but did 
> not directly address -- is the extent to which the Establishment 
> Clause limits this kind of government preferentialism.  I suspect 
> some of Rick's students may raise this point even though it is is not 
> suggested by his comments.
>
> Alan Brownstein
> ________________________________________
> From: religionlaw-bounces at lists.ucla.edu 
> [religionlaw-bounces at lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Duncan 
> [nebraskalawprof at yahoo.com]
> Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 8:22 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Summum
>
> Here are some thoughts of mine I am sharing today with the students 
> in my Con law Seminar in which one of the students is presenting 
> today on Summam:
>
> I was re-reading Summum this morning, because Mark is going to give 
> his presentation on the case this afternoon. And here is something 
> that struck me about Justice Alito's opinion.
>
> He starts off giving a tribute to the essential nature of government 
> speech. He says:
>
> -- "the Free Speech Clause... does not regulate government speech"
>
> -- "a government entity has the right to speak for itself"
>
> --government is "entitled to say what it wishes"
>
> --government may "select the views it wants to express"
>
> --"It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points 
> of view"
>
> --"it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it 
> lacked this freedom"
>
> --"To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment 
> heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's 
> voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the question."
>
> Yet, without missing a beat or apparently even being aware of the 
> contradiction, Alito goes on to say that of course "government speech 
> must comport with the Establishment Clause."
>
> Why should this be so? Why should the Court be so ready to accept a 
> "heckler's veto" against passive government speech--such as a 
> nativity display in a public park acknowledging the fact of the 
> Christmas holiday? Why should we think that the government's 
> critically important right to say what it wishes and to express the 
> viewpoints it chooses is subject to being enjoined at the whim of any 
> citizen who is offended by the government's message acknowledging 
> religion. How could the doctrine of incorporation, which protects 
> only "liberty interests" against state deprivations, give a citizen 
> the right to restrict government from "saying what it wishes" by 
> means of a passive display that restricts the liberty of no one, 
> since all one need do if one is offended by a passive display 
> recognizing a religious holiday is to avert one's eye? Is the 
> "endorsement test" a liberty-protecting test, or is it a structural 
> limitation on government that somehow was mistakenly
>  incorporated as a "li!
>  berty" under the 14th Amendment?
>
> These are the questions that keep me up late at night pondering the 
> inconsistencies of the Court's treatment of government speech.
>
>
> Of course, some will say religious speech by government is different, 
> because the EC restricts the power of government to endorse religious 
> ideas. But isn't that a structural limitation on government, as 
> opposed to a protection of liberty? And how can a structural rule 
> restricting the power of Congress under the First Amendment apply 
> against state governments under a test that explicitly incorporates 
> only "liberty" interests against state deprivations?
>
> The thing about the Summum opinion that struck me so vividly was the 
> contrast between Alito's tribute to the "right" of the state to say 
> what it wishes as essential to the very nature of government and his 
> casual acceptance of the EC as a limitation on the speech of the 
> states. Heckler's vetos are bad except when they are good!
>
> Just a few thoughts about a recent decision I thought I would share 
> with the list.
>
> Cheers.
>
> Rick Duncan
> Welpton Professor of Law
> University of Nebraska College of Law
> Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
>
>
> "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. 
> Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting
> the vote."--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of 
> Franklin)
>
> "It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's 
> existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start 
> doubting His existence."  --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of 
> Conscience)
>
> "Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the perversion of 
> the best is the worst." -- Id.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Religionlaw at lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as 
> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are 
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can 
> (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>
>
>
>

   
  Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713
-----Inline Attachment Follows-----

_______________________________________________
To post, send message to Religionlaw at lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.


      
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/religionlaw/attachments/20090326/52e385a0/attachment.htm