"[B]ut for the Muslim faith, the children would have no faith at all"

[Volokh, Eugene]

An interesting item from Linnell v. Linnell, 2008 WL 1913991 (Conn.
Super. Apr. 15):

"The children, by the parties' agreement prior to their birth, have been
raised in the Muslim faith. The children, or at least Kelsey at this
point, attend weekly religious instruction. They observe the Muslim
holidays, as well as some of the Muslim rules (i.e., no consumption of
pork). The Plaintiff testified that he agreed to raise the children in
the Muslim faith, 'so long as we were married.' The Defendant testified
that she 'wouldn't compromise on religion.' The children's faith should
not be premised on the status of the parties' relationship. Further, the
record would support that but for the Muslim faith, the children would
have no faith at all. Neither party presented evidence that would
suggest their original commitment to raise the children as Muslims
should no longer be honored and respected."

Two questions:  (1)  The court says here that the plaintiff agreed to
raise the children as Muslims "so long as we were married," but then
says there was a "commitment to raise the children as Muslims" that the
court would enforce.  Even if premarital contracts to raise children in
a particular religion are enforceable (as I'm inclined to say they would
be), let's assume that the agreement was indeed as plaintiff said.  Is
it permissible for the judge to order -- as he seemingly did (the order
isn't clear on this, but the discussion in the opinion very strongly
points to this, and I take it that divorcing parents don't lightly
ignore the judge's sentiments as expressed in the opinion) -- that the
father continue to cooperate in raising the children Muslim?

(2)  What's this about "Further, the record would support that but for
the Muslim faith, the children would have no faith at all"?  Can that
really be a constitutionally permissible factor?

Eugene