Ministerial exception and breach of contract claims

[Michael masinter]

Florida courts likely would dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if Cooper were a ministerial employee.  See Archdiocese of
Miami, Inc. v. Minagorri, 954 So.2d 640 (Fla. App. 2007), review
dismissed, 2008 WL 2608697 (Fla. 2008).

Michael R. Masinter			3305 College Avenue
Professor of Law			Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
Nova Southeastern University		(954) 262-6151 (voice)
Shepard Broad Law Center		(954) 262-3835 (fax)
masinter at nova.edu			Chair, ACLU of Florida Legal Panel

On Wed, 30 Jul 2008, Volokh, Eugene wrote:

> 	Cooper v. Church of St. Benedict, 2008 WL 2894699 (Pa. Super.
> 2008), concludes that plaintiff's breach of employment agreement
> complaint can't be dismissed, because there isn't enough evidence to
> show that her position as music director at a Catholic church is
> ministerial.  But does the exception even apply to a breach of
> contract claim, where the contract doesn't seem to have any provisions
> that require interpretation of church doctrine?  Or would determining
> whether she was satisfactorily performing her contractual duties --
> even in the absence of theological language in the contract --
> necessarily involve such entanglement that a civil court can't enforce
> such a contract?
> 
> 	Eugene
> 
> ¶ 3 Cooper's Second Amended Complaint contains just twelve paragraphs
> and one exhibit. Cooper alleges that on or about January 1, 2000, she
> entered into a verbal agreement with the Church to play the organ at
> masses for payment of $275 per week. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 3.
> She further alleges that the oral contract was "renewable yearly for a
> period of six years", and that the parties did in fact renew the
> verbal agreement each year from 2001-2005. Id. at ¶ 3-4. Cooper
> alleges that during the summer of 2005, the parties agreed to amend
> the contract by verbal agreement to increase her compensation to $283
> per week and to make the contract renewable for another six years. Id.
> at ¶ 5. Cooper alleged that the parties renewed the oral contract for
> another year in January 2006, id. at ¶ 6, but that in April 2006 the
> Church by letter attempted to unilaterally reduce her pay to $50 per
> week. Id. at ¶ 9 and Exhibit A. Finally, she alleges that commencing
> in 2001 she also voluntarily assumed the duties of music director for
> no additional pay until a replacement could be found, and that when a
> replacement was hired in April 2006 she resumed her contractual duties
> as organist. Id. at 7-8.
> 
> ¶ 4 The trial court granted the Church's preliminary objections and dismissed Cooper's Second Amended Complaint. In its written opinion, the trial court offered the following reasons for its disposition of the case: "We accept the argument of [the Church] that [Cooper's] contract claim against Defendant Roman Catholic Church is barred by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which prohibits judicial encroachment upon decisions made by a religious institution concerning the employment of its ministers. Because the Roman Catholic Church views music as an integral part of its Catholic worship, the Organist/Musical Director is considered a minister of the Church. Therefore, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction." ...
> 
> ¶ 6 Under the "ministerial exception," the Free Exercise Clause of the
> First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits courts
> from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in cases where the court's
> involvement would encroach on decisions made by religious institutions
> concerning employment of ministers. Fraser v. The Salvation Army, 1998
> U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209 at *8 (E.D.Pa.1998). Rooted in the First
> Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom, the ministerial exception
> precludes courts from considering claims involving the employment
> relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial
> employees, based on the institution's constitutional right to be free
> from judicial interference in the selection of those employees.
> Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th
> Cir.2007).
> 
> ¶ 7 The ministerial exception applies only to ministers, and whether a
> person is or is not a minister requires an evaluation of the person's
> actual functions within the church. For purposes of the ministerial
> exception, courts have applied a "ministerial-function" test, pursuant
> to which the exception applies "if primary duties include teaching,
> spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious
> order, or supervision of participation in religious ritual and
> worship." Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.2d 294, 304 n. 6 (3d
> Cir.2006) (citing Rayburn v. Gen'l Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists,
> 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir.1985) ....
> 
> ¶ 8 In granting the Church's preliminary objections, the trial court
> erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that because "the Roman
> Catholic Church views music as an integral part of its Catholic
> worship", anyone who holds the position of "Organist/Musical Director"
> is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. We find no
> basis in either state or federal cases applying the ministerial
> exception for such a per se classification based merely upon the
> person's title....
> 
> ¶ 13 Alternatively, the Church asks that we affirm the trial court's
> decision based upon Pennsylvania's presumption that all employment is
> at-will, asserting that Cooper signed a written contract with the
> Church (not attached to the Second Amended Complaint) acknowledging
> her at-will status. While we are usually hesitant to address issues
> that have not been ruled upon by the trial court or briefed by
> opposing counsel, on this occasion we note that the Second Amended
> Complaint alleges that the oral contract between Cooper and the Church
> was not at-will, but rather for a term of six years (renewable
> annually). In addition, given our scope of review with regard to
> preliminary objections, we may not consider the legal impact of an
> alleged written contract that is neither mentioned in the Second
> Amended Complaint nor attached to it....
> 
> CONCURRING STATEMENT BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.: ¶ 1 I agree with the
> Majority that at this stage in the proceedings, the record is
> insufficiently developed to support the trial court's conclusion that
> Cooper is a "minister" for First Amendment purposes, and therefore I
> join in the Opinion. There has been no discovery regarding Cooper's
> specific duties and responsibilities as organist/music director. That
> being said, I would note that decisional law has consistently applied
> the ministerial exception to music and choir directors. [Citations
> omitted.] Therefore, following the discovery phase and depending on
> the functions of Cooper's position, summary judgment in the Church's
> favor may well be appropriate.
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