Photographer's right to refuse to photograph a commitmentceremony?
Volokh, Eugene
VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu
Tue Jan 29 15:56:51 PST 2008
I sympathize with Doug's view, and the arguments for it. But
it's important to recognize that there are two possible reasons one can
support antidiscrimination law: (1) One wants to make sure that people
have reasonably equal access to various services without regard to race,
religion, sexual orientation, etc. (2) One thinks that every instance
of discrimination based on race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. in
certain fields (perhaps with a few exceptions) is a personal wrong that
the law ought to remedy when the victim so demands -- a sort of tortious
invasion of individual dignity that a victim may sue over even when the
damages are minor.
If one takes view 1, then Doug's argument is excellent; courts
could conclude that view 1 represents the only compelling interest, but
the interest isn't implicated so long as there are many other
photographers available. But if one takes view 2, then Doug's argument
is largely beside the point, precisely because there's "an interest in
not being discriminated against in the abstract," just as there's an
interest in not having people willfully trespass on your land, or
willfully infringe your copyrights, or commercially use your name or
likeness, even when the damages to you are exceedingly modest or even
next to nil.
I think view 1 is the better of the two. But I'm not sure how a
court would reject view 2 as not representing a "compelling government
interest," given that it all depends on whether you think discrimination
is a tortious harm akin to trespass, copyright infringement, etc.
Eugene
Doug Laycock writes:
Vance may be right as a prediction of what many judges will do.
But it doesn't make much sense as an interpretation of compelling
interest. Especially if this photographer turns out to be in
Albuquerque or Santa Fe, there are surely plenty of other photographers
available. A claimed right to force another to perform personal
services, when comparable services are readily available in the market,
to vindicate -- what? Not an interest in having the ceremony
photographed, but at best an interest in not being discriminated against
in the abstract, or in not having one's feelings hurts, and in fact
probably an interest precisely in forcing a set of values on the
photographer for the purpose of scoring a political point. None of that
matches up well against an interest in not violating what the
photographer understands to be a duty to God. A judge who rules
otherwise is refusing to take RFRA seriously.
If she's out in the middle of the desert and the nearest
substitute photographer is 100 miles away, maybe it's different. If
it's housing or a job and if those things are scarce, it is more likely
to be different. But a right to have my ceremony photographed by an
objecting photographer instead of a cheerfully consenting photographer
is not a compelling interest.
More information about the Religionlaw
mailing list