Shielding child whose mother is A from father's B lifestyle/ideology/religion?

[Volokh, Eugene]

    Vance's proposed approach has the merit of being, at least facially,
viewpoint-neutral; and I take it that it would apply to all ideologies,
religious or otherwise.  But let me probe whether it is indeed so.  
 
    Say, for instance, a child has been raised in a racist household.
After the breakup, the custodial parent remains racist.  But the
noncustodial parent changes his views, and starts telling children that
people of other races are OK, and even exposes the child to the
noncustodial parent's friends of another race.  This makes the child
"upset and scared" (the only findings of "harm" that I saw in the order,
so we're not talking about extremely serious psychological upset).
 
    Under Vance's approach, I take it the court could order the
noncustodial parent not to "expos[e the child] to any aspect of the
lifestyle of the [noncustodial parent] which could confuse the child's
moral and ideological formation," which is to say to the noncustodial
parent's racially egalitarian views and lifestyle.  Likewise if the
noncustodial parent is more open to sexual egalitarianism, religious
tolerance, or tolerance of gays and lesbians than the custodial parent.
Is that right?  And if in that situation the court would say "Oh, no, of
course you can't order a parent to stop exposing the child to such good,
helpful-to-the-child views," then doesn't that mean the standard below
actually is viewpoint-based after all?
 
    Eugene
 
________________________________

From: religionlaw-bounces at lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-bounces at lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Vance R. Koven
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 8:52 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Shielding child whose mother is Catholic from father's
Wiccanlifestyle?



	I think Steve's message illustrates exactly the point. What's in
the best interests of *the* child is a matter to be decided with
reference to the particular child in question and to his/her family's
unique circumstances. It is not a matter for ideology. 
	
	If a child is raised in a household in which differences are
extolled and exhibited, then being exposed to them post-divorce doesn't
in itself seem likely to harm the child. But where a family has adhered
to a particular framework, and that framework is suddenly jolted, not
only by the divorce but by radical changes in what had been viewed as a
fundamental aspect of child-rearing, then it seems perfectly consistent
with the legal standard, psychology and the still largely accepted role
of the family, for a judge to ascertain whether harm is likely to occur,
and take reasonable actions to prevent harm. 
	
	Imposing a Unitarian world view on, say, a Pentecostal child who
had consistently been reared that way, while it may seem to Steve like a
"good thing," would be the worst kind of judicial bullying, as would an
order for a child raised in a Unitarian household to be sent off to
Catholic school, where in each case the judge reasonably concluded that
this would create a cognitive dissonance that could adversely affect the
child's emotional stability. 
	
	Vance
	

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/religionlaw/attachments/20080124/690bdce2/attachment.htm