Religious exemption regimes and possession of stun guns

[Volokh, Eugene]

	I'm thinking of writing something on laws prohibiting possession
of Tasers and similar stun guns.  Several states ban tasers, see
http://www.taser.org/laws.html, even though no states ban all handguns.
At least two states and one city ban carrying of tasers while broadly
allowing pretty much any law-abiding adult to get a license to carry a
handgun.

	The laws raise obvious right-to-bear-arms questions, though the
one case that confronted this challenge (People v. Smelter, a Michigan
appellate decision, applying the Michigan Constitution's individual
right to bear arms) rejected it without much analysis.  They also raise
questions under state constitutional provisions that secure a right to
defend life and property.

	But I wanted to ask about how these laws should fare in those
states that have state RFRAs, or state Free Exercise Clauses that have
been interpreted to follow Sherbert/Yoder.  Say that someone feels a
religious obligation not to use lethal force, even in self-defense -- a
not uncommon view, I think.  But say that her commitment to nonviolence
does not extend to a bar on the use of nonlethal force in self-defense
(also a not uncommon view, I take it, even among those who refuse to use
lethal force).  She therefore wants to use a Taser, because she wants to
be able to protect herself effectively, and because she feels that a
Taser is not lethal enough to fit within her religious prohibition.
(Tasers can cause death, but so can punches or even pushes; assume, as I
believe is indeed the case, that the risk is low enough that people may
treat them as fundamentally nonlethal weapons for purposes of their own
felt religious beliefs.)

	Would she be able to prevail under a religious exemption regime?
I take it her claim is that the ban on tasers burdens her religious
beliefs, because it leaves her unable to use the one really effective
self-defense weapon that is consistent with her religious beliefs.
Would that qualify as a substantial burden?

	I take it that her claim is also that, though there is doubtless
a compelling interest in preventing crime using Tasers (which I'm sure
could be used as tools by robbers, rapists, or other attackers, though
apparently fired Tasers eject a bunch of serial-numbered confetti that
makes their criminal users easier to trace and thus makes them highly
suboptimal crime weapons), applying the law to her can't be treated as
necessary to serve that interest, given that gun possession and licensed
carrying is allowed despite the even more compelling interest in
preventing gun crime.  Should that argument prevail?

	Many thanks in advance,

	Eugene