"that which offends" vs. "that which causes pain"
Volokh, Eugene
VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu
Sat Nov 3 14:14:04 PDT 2007
My sense is that it's not possible to distinguish "that which
offends" from "that which causes pain," but if someone wants to come up
with a proposal, I'd love to hear it. Indeed, part of the problem is
that so many people quite plausibly argue that so many different things
-- flagburning, blasphemy, condemnation (even polite) of attributes that
they see as central to their personality (such as homosexuality), being
called "scab" on a picket line by their colleagues, and so on -- "cause
pain."
Eugene
Brad Pardee writes:
There is a difference, though, between that which offends and that
which causes pain. If Phelps' band of idiots wants to demonstrate in
front of a recruiting center, that's one thing. But when they picket a
funeral and intrude on the family's time to bid farewell to their loved
ones, that is designed to cause harm and inflict pain on the grieving.
That's where the idea of a claim based on IIED has a lot of appeal to
me. Isn't it possible to make the legal distinction between offensive
and painful, or does that merely invite somebody to make the argument (a
baseless one, to my mind) that simply being offended is painful?
The other question that comes to mind regards the potential precedent
being set here. In my 17 years working at a major university, I saw the
assertion made on many occasions that anybody who says that sexual
intimacy between two member of the same sex is wrong is both offensive
and guilty of hate speech. If this verdict stands (and I do hope there
is a way for it to not only stand but be etched in stone), how can it be
done without opening a Pandora's box for a lawsuit against any minister
who preaches a sermon in which he states that sex outside of a
heterosexual marriage is sin, on the grounds that it was deemed
offensive and unprotected hate speech? And if so, wouldn't that set a
dangerous precedent (i.e., if what Phelps said was offensive and
therefore actionable, why shouldn't what Pastor X says be actionable if
somebody finds it offensive)? For example, if a practicing homosexual
could file a hate speech suit against a minister who preaches that
homosexual behavior is sin, what is to stop the practicing adulterer
from filing suit using the same rationale against a minister who
preaches against adultery?
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