IIED and vagueness

[Steven Jamar]

On 11/1/07, Volokh, Eugene <VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu> wrote:
>         (1)  How does Hustler teach that IIED is a viable tort, as
> applied to otherwise protected speech (or at least otherwise protected
> speech on matters of public concern).  True, it didn't hold that IIED is
> impermissible as to otherwise protected speech -- but did it ever hold
> that it is viable as to such speech?

Agreed.  But the court did not say that IIED is out of bounds and I
read Hustler's reasoning and opinions to permit IIED -- though I agree
it is indeed reading tea leaves to a large extent and the exact issue
was not part of the holding.
>
>         (2)  Defamation requires that a statement be factually false.
> That's sometimes not easy to define, and often not easy to tell, but
> it's much clearer than an "outrageousness" standard.

Agreed, but I don't find that to be an infirmity.  Maliciousness is
hard to tell to.  As are many other things in the law.

>
>         (3)  I say it again:  The Court has repeatedly held that the
> lower scrutiny applicable to time, place, and manner restrictions is
> applicable only to *content-neutral* time, place, and manner
> restrictions.

They say that, but the "secondary effects" doctrine seems to undermine
it a bit, no?

Steve


-- 
Prof. Steven Jamar
Howard University School of Law