InnerChange Litigation
Steven Jamar
stevenjamar at gmail.com
Thu Dec 6 11:06:50 PST 2007
On Dec 6, 2007, at 10:22 AM, Paul Diamond wrote:
> I must admit that I am with Professor Lund on this.
>
[snip]
> 3. Has anyone thought of the prisoner First Amendment rights!
> What is prisoners are so willing to find a new life and answer to
> their problems,- that they want to volunteer for the pfm programme
> and request the Ohio State to facilitate (not endorse) their
> rights. What is the interest of the State in denying such a request?
The problem is a state paying for them and not facilitating, but
doing essentially a sole-source proselytization.
I don't see a constitutional bar to letting religious-based groups
provide services upon individual prisoner request -- indeed one could
have a free exercise violation at some point if the requests were
denied under some circumstances. But that is a far cry from this case.
But here, we have endorsement and direct payment. Those seem to
still be more than one step over the wall.
>
> Paul Diamond, barrister.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Vance R. Koven
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2007 2:03 PM
> Subject: Re: InnerChange Litigation
>
> There are several ways of looking at how PFM might or might not be
> liable for money damages here. The first thing that leapt to mind
> was as an agent for an undisclosed principal--since had it been
> known PFM was acting on behalf of the state, which was under a
> prohibition, then its acts would be immediately perceived as
> wrongful. However, the liability of an agent in this case is, so
> far as I know, limited to those with whom it transacts downstream.
>
> A taxpayer suit might be analogous to a derivative action by
> shareholders, in which the shareholders act in the name of the
> corporation to recover damages caused by the wrongful acts of
> corporate fiduciaries and agents. As others have pointed out, PFM,
> though, did not do anything inherently wrongful, they were only
> wrongful because committed willy-nilly in the name of the state;
> the inherently wrongful acts were committed by *other* state agents
> who appointed PFM to undertake its activities in the prisons. It
> would be highly salutary, though as far as I know it is
> unprecedented (other than by specific statute), for state officials
> to be personally liable to taxpayers for waste/misuse of state
> funds pursuing unlawful objectives; but that's not PFM's problem.
> If you take the old hoary approach of tracing the duties of the
> different parties, it seems as though the only party with any duty
> to taxpayers/citizens is the state itself. The state officials owe
> duties to the state to act within the scope of their engagement,
> and you can say the same for PFM, but its scope is radically
> different from theirs, and nobody has suggested (at least in this
> discussion) that PFM did not comply with its (ultimately invalid)
> mandate.
>
> Another route might be the doctrine of ultra vires, since plainly
> the state had no authority to appoint PFM as its agent to do what
> the state could not do directly. Modern corporate law has
> essentially eliminated actions on the ultra vires theory, but if I
> remember correctly, contracts ultra vires are void, not just
> voidable. On that theory PFM might have to give the money back, but
> I confess this is just theory-spinning on my part without examining
> any cases. It's been a *long* time since I needed to know this,
> either for teaching or practicing!
>
> Vance
>
> On Dec 5, 2007 12:45 AM, Christopher Lund <lund at mc.edu> wrote:
> The points by Profesors Lupu, Green & Lederman make a lot of sense,
> and
> I'll check out Brentwood Academy, which sounds helpful. Maybe it's
> just
> recoupment here that I have trouble understanding. Recoupment
> seems to
> have little value here except as a way of punishing PFM. Recoupment
> means that PFM now has to pay Iowa for the constitutional violation
> they
> committed together. I don't think that makes much sense. Maybe
> PFM is
> as culpable as Iowa -- but is there really an argument that PFM is
> more
> culpable, that the Establishment Clause applies more to PFM than it
> does
> to Iowa? By virtue of the taxpayer theory, Iowa suddenly gets to flip
> sides in the litigation. It doesn't have to pay the plaintiffs. It
> instead gets to become the plaintiffs and take PFM's money back on
> their
> alleged behalf.
>
> Now I understand the theory -- that the injury was taxpayer dollars
> going to PFM, that the remedy, if there is to be one, means the money
> has to go back, and that Iowa this time could spend it on something
> constitutional. But it seems like the remedy of recoupment means
> we've
> moved full circle from (1) Iowa being responsible, to (2) Iowa and PFM
> being jointly responsible, to (3) PFM being chiefly (or even solely)
> responsible. Maybe I'm missing something, but I find this
> problematic.
>
> Best,
> Chris
>
>
> Christopher C. Lund
> Assistant Professor of Law
> Mississippi College School of Law
> 151 E. Griffith St.
> Jackson, MS 39201
> (601) 925-7141 (office)
> (601) 925-7113 (fax)
>
>
> --
> Vance R. Koven
> Boston, MA USA
> vrkoven at world.std.com
>
>
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--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567
2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:stevenjamar at gmail.com
Washington, DC 20008 http://iipsj.com/SDJ/
"The modern trouble is in a low capacity to believe in precepts which
restrict and restrain private interests and desires."
Walter Lippmann
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