Locke v. Davey Analysis

[Greg Baylor]

I am curious as to how those on this list would characterize the analysis
used by the majority in Locke v. Davey.
 
The Court obviously rejected the notion that non-neutral laws essentially
always violate the Free Exercise Clause, (presumably) without regard to the
magnitude of the burden imposed on the claimant's religious exercise.
 
At the same the Court did not apply a straightforward substantial
burden/compelling state interest/least restrictive means analysis.  As I
read the majority opinion, after acknowledging the non-neutrality of the law
in question, the Court looked at the magnitude of the burden not in
isolation, but rather in the context of other factors, including the
character of the law that caused the burden on Davey and the importance of
the state's interest.  
 
[When I say "the character of the law that caused the burden on Davey," I am
referring to the Court's observations about the otherwise religion-friendly
character of Washington's education aid law (e.g., Davey could have kept his
scholarship and majored in something other than devotional theology at the
seriously religious Northwest College).]
 
In other words, the Court seemed to be applying a multifactorial approach,
under which a claimant's weakness on one factor (e.g., burden) theoretically
might be rehabilitated by his or her strength on others (e.g., the magnitude
of the state's interest).
 
Do you agree or disagree?  Thanks.
 
Greg Baylor
 
Gregory S. Baylor
Director, Center for Law & Religious Freedom
Christian Legal Society
8001 Braddock Road, Suite 300
Springfield, VA 22151
(703) 642-1070 x 3502
(703) 642-1075 fax
gbaylor at clsnet.org
http://www.clsnet.org <http://www.clsnet.org/>  
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