Smith and exemptions

[Brownstein, Alan]

As my response to David suggests, I don't think my point reflects a
deeply secular point of view - that religion is just another ideology.
The point is whether as a matter of constitutional law, and in light of
the several values and goals of our constitutional system, it is
sometimes necessary to review regulations of religious expressive
activities under free speech, voting rights, and ballot access doctrine
rather than free exercise doctrine.

 

I think religion is multi-dimensional and crosses several constitutional
boundary lines (speech, equality, liberty). Because it does so, it is
necessary to draw doctrinal lines of demarcation - at least some of the
time.

 

Alan 

 

________________________________

John Taylor is trying to post the full opinion, a task well beyond my
technical competence.

I tend to agree with Alan about speech based claims of this sort not
being decided differently because the speaker is religious. In any
event, aside from the exemption point, I have trouble seeing a
particular burden on religion by campaign finance disclosure laws-or for
that matter charitable registration laws.  However, the trial judge can
hardly be faulted for going through a complaint cause of action by cause
of action and dispensing with all the claims seriatim.

Alan's point reflects a deeply secular point of view-that religion is
just another ideology. David is quite right to question whether the
constitution accepts that conceptualization of religion. It is ironic,
though, that Alan's point is underscored by the various cases beginning
with Widmar in which religious speakers have urged exactly his position
to gain access to public places and to justify public funding of
religious enterprises.

Marc Stern 

 

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