UC Case: Facts from Complaint

[RJLipkin at aol.com]

Thanks Frank. Two quick  points.
 
        (1) Not only doesn't  constitutional democracy assume moral 
relativism, for one to urge that  constitutional democracy has normatively desirable 
one probably can't avoid  non-relative moral reasons for that claim.
 
        (2)  As I've indicated  before I do not believe that "non-empirical 
knowledge of  immaterial reality" fares any better in grounding rights than a 
simple  commitment to avoid suffering by respecting human beings.  If you  
respond, but how can you ground a commitment to avoid suffering, etc. without  
appealing to an immaterial reality, my reply is why should I be impressed or  
motivated by an immaterial reality as grounding rights more than I am  motivated 
by my own apprehension of how rights contribute to what I  consider moral 
flourishing? We won't, of course, settle this matter.  But I  would urge you to 
see that there's no noncircular argument in favor of grounding  rights in 
immaterial reality anymore than there is such an argument grounding  rights in our 
own apprehension of evil and the importance of rights.  My  constitution makes 
me much more responsive to my own apprehension of suffering,  evil, and the 
need for rights or some counterpart concept than to  some immaterial reality as 
grounding rights. You can and should stick to  your story, but don't think 
your story is convincing, or should be convincing,  to anyone who is not already 
predisposed to accepting it.
 
Cheers,
Bobby 
 
Robert Justin  Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of  Law
Delaware
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