What causes more divisiveness?

[Alan Brownstein]

I am late to this thread. I apologize if my comment is redundent to 
earlier posts.

Perhaps the issue here should be understood to focus on religious 
divisivenss which may include, but may also have a broader meaning than, 
religious strife.

Religious divisiveness might refer to two additional concerns -- not only 
whether religious people get angry at each other because of the 
government's actions. 1. Whether we increase the likelihood that 
religious groups defined in denominational terms will be advantaged or 
disadvantaged if they gain control over government. 2. Whether we promote 
the fragmentation of our communities along denominational religious lines 
both for political reasons (because a significant number of co-
religionists in a community can accrue political power)and for 
institutional reasons (because only a sufficiently large group of co-
religionists can develop an institutional infrastructure capable of 
obtaining a fair share of the public sector pie.) 

A vigorously enforced free exercise clause and establishment clause 
reduces both the risks of being a religious minority in a community and 
the benefits of being a member of a large minority or the majority in a 
community. These joint guarantees promote religious integration -- in the 
sense of people of different faiths living and working together and 
developing the kind of understanding and empathy that regular 
interactions may foster.

Government leading religious observances or endorsing religious messages, 
on the other hand, is religiously divisive in this sense. So is the 
government funding of religious institutions -- if the services those 
institutions provide are infused with religious content and if they 
discriminate on the basis of religion. 

If Justice Scalia's understanding of the Establishment Clause in McCreary 
was adopted; Hindus, Buddhists, and members of other non-monotheistic 
faiths would have a significant additional incentive to congregate 
together in communities to avoid marginalization. If Scalia's 
understanding of the Establishment Clause in Mitchell v. Helms was 
adopted, Jewish social workers, for example, would have to think 
carefully about moving to communities with small Jewish populations -- 
because a significant number of publicly funded jobs in their field might 
be religiously restricted -- substantially limiting their employment 
opportunities. 

I recognize that not everyone on the list views this kind of divisiveness 
as problematic, much less constitutionally significant. But for those of 
us who do -- and that may just be me -- it is another factor to consider.

Alan Brownstein
UC Davis