Establisment clause and oppressive taxation

[Francis Beckwith]

Given the regulatory state in which we live‹one that requires that parents
who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the
school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that
the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily
dispositive in resolving this dispute.  Suppose, for example, it were
discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the
purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their
homes.  Would that violate Madison¹s principle, since the purchase results
from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics?  Or would it be consistent
with Madison¹s principle, since the purchase is the result of the free
agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a
government-directed order (as in the case of religious assessments in early
America)?  Suppose we change the ³food stamps² to ³school vouchers² and the
³bread and grape juice² to ³Catholic school admission²?

I¹m not sure Madison is helpful here.

Frank



On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, "Paul Finkelman" <paul-finkelman at utulsa.edu> wrote:

> I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of
> the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the
> possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion.  That
> was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher
> system is all about;  when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means
> that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of
> someone else.  Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive
> that was.  I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this.
> 
> Paul Finkelman
> 
> Pybas, Kevin M wrote:
>> All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is
>> akin to the one Rick raised.  He asked
>>  
>>   
>>> whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the
>>> undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the
>>> Establishment Clause's enforceable content.
>>>     
>> 
>> WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it
>> really religious strife that worries us?  In other words, in the context of
>> the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of
>> education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in
>> Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense?  In
>> other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated
>> political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the
>> word "ordinary" may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I
>> mean.)  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> ________________________________
>> 
>> From: religionlaw-bounces at lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Paul Finkelman
>> Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM
>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>> Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>   
>> 
>> 
>> 
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