Coercion, religious exemptions, and empirical evidence

[RJLipkin at aol.com]

I misunderstood Eugene's  position.  I thought he was addressing the problem 
of "the fraudulent  exemptee" because too many false claims of religious 
exemptions would undermine  a robust system of accommodations.  I now see that I 
was wrong.   Eugene is concerned not with the system of accommodation, but 
rather with the  alleged personal right of fraudulent exemptees not to be pressured 
or  coerced into committing fraud. 
 
        But now I'm stumped.   How in the world is that case of the 
fraudulent exemptee similar to  Lee-type plaintiffs? Do people falsely claiming 
exemption on religious  grounds--for example in order to receive unemployment 
benefits or being excused  from attending school after a certain period of time or 
not to learning  Darwin--in order to gain the benefits granted non-fraudulent,  
religious devotees have a personal right to do so?  Is Eugene  insisting that 
since the fraudulent exemptee is genuinely pressured to commit  fraud--for 
reasons we might all sympathize with--he or she has a personal  right to do so?
 
        I'm sure I must be missing  more than just something because I cannot 
see how the fraudulent exemptee is in  circumstances anything like Lee-type 
plaintiffs. We might sympathize  with fraudulent exemptees.  But how do they 
warrant a personal  right to commit fraud on the grounds that they experienced 
feelings of social  pressure and coercion? True, Lee-type plaintiffs and 
Eugene's  examples might all feel or be coerced.  But that's where the  similarities 
end. Fraudulent exemptees cannot claim "coercion made me to it,"  and by so 
claim a violation to their personal rights.  Lee-type  plaintiff contend that 
coercion is the reason justifying their claim to a  "neutral" graduation 
ceremony. What is the claim--based on coercion--of  fraudulent exemptees? To me the 
fraudulent exemptee and Lee-type  plaintiffs are in totally (obviously) 
different circumstances, and so  embracing Lee in no way compels us to deal with 
Eugene's  examples. Before saying anymore, however, it would be helpful (at least 
to  me) if Eugene would explain why the case of the fraudulent exemptee,  
however sincere, is relevant to Lee at all, because, as is  obvious, I have 
apparently misconstrued the use Eugene envisions for the  case of the fraudulent 
exemptee.  
 
Bobby
    
 
 
Robert Justin  Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of  Law
Delaware
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