FW: NRO Article

[Eastman, John]

I took the liberty to forward our discussion to Francis Beckwith, as per
Ed Darrell's invitation.  Here is his reply, which I am sending to the
list with Beckwith's permission.

John Eastman

-----Original Message-----
From: Beckwith, Francis J. 
Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 2:31 PM
To: Eastman, John
Subject: RE: NRO Article

John:
 
Here's my reply. 
The  purpose of my work in this area of my interest is to explore a
question of constitutional jurisprudence. It was not a treatise on
science, and in fact, I say as much in the book's introductory chapter.
And, as I have told Mr. Leiter, in at least two private email notes (if
I recollect the number correctly), I do not hold, and have never held,
the view that ID should be taught in public schools. In fact, in several
interviews I have maintained it is not a good idea to teach ID in public
schools at the present time because its publication record, in the
biological sciences, is thin. However, one could conceivably include
some ID-type material in the sections of a textbook that deal with
philosophy and history of science (which they do sometimes), and here I
am thinking of M. Rea, A. Plantinga, R. Koons type arguments.  But
whether such a move is sound pedagogy is a question outside of my
interests and areas of specialty. Nevertheless, I don't think there's
anything unconstitutional with including such material, which is why I
was INVITED to offer my comments at the school hearings in Austin in
July. I declined to testify in September because my area of specialty is
not the minutia of textbook content, but rather, the general
jurisprudential question of Constitutional permissibilty. Contrary to
what Leiter and others have said, I did not testify on behalf of the
Discovery Institute. I was there on my own accord as a result of a board
member's invitation who had contacted me through the Discovery
Institute. I am proudly a fellow of the Discovery Institute. DI provided
a modest fellowship for me so that I can do research in this area while
in law school. DI never told me what to write. I received the fellowship
long before my writing was completed. 

My work, if you ever take the time to look it over, is quite modest in
its ambitions, and quite conservative in its suggestions.  Once again,
to repeat what I have told others several times, my work deals very
little with biology and more with the philosophy of science, demarcation
theories, and conceptual questions about science and what counts as
"knowledge."  Don't get me wrong, I have a much higher regard for ID
than many scientists do. In fact, I think there are two reasons why they
are not entertained as much as they should: (1) the socialized
resistance to anything that sounds "religious," (2) the lack of training
on the part of scientists in recognizing what an argument is and how to
assess it.  This is why philosophers and lawyers are top heavy in the ID
movement (though there are, of course, scientists as well). But I have
no horse in this race. For instance, if you had to pin me down on what
view I hold on these matters, I am not settled. When I was younger I was
a theistic evolutionist, though I think now there are some interesting
conceptual difficulties in holding this position.  In fact, of all the
theistic proofs, the design argument is the least compelling for me. I
am a fan of the kalam argument, Plantinga's ontological argument, and
most recently, the moral argument, which I defend in article entitled,
"Why I Am Not a Relativist," which you can get for free off my website
francisbeckwith.com.  
 
Concerning the substance of Professor's Leiter's charge, let my
encourage you to read my published law review articles on this subject,
some of which are copied as adobe files on my website.  The works of
mine that appeared in all these journals--and that formed the core of my
book Law, Darwinism, and Public Education--was originally from my M.J.S.
dissertation at the Washington University School of Law (St. Louis).  My
dissertation advisor was Stanley Paulsen (a philosopher and lawyer whose
early work in philosophy was in the philosophy of science). He
scrutinized the text, offered me feedback and critique, and approved it
on behalf of the faculty, which conferred on me my degree.  I come to
the conclusion in the book that teaching ID in public schools would not
violate the establishment clause, though I do not address the question
of whether, as a matter of policy, it should be taught. 
 
Since Mr. Darrell has taken it upon himself to issue a preliminary
judgment about the quality of my scholarship--e.g., "I do not think
Beckwith's book could survive a good cross examination"--I would like to
know where precisely in the text he thinks I go wrong and why.  
 
We philosophers have a tough time with scientists who stipulate criteria
for which they offer no defense. Let me illustrate. When I spoke at
Texas Tech last month a biologist in the audience said to me, "Science
is what is testable."  This is like intellectual T-ball.  Here's why,
and I will run through this quickly. The claim that "science must be
testable" is itself not proven by empirical testing and therefore is
itself not science. Fine. I agree. But that means that the demarcation
between science and non-science is a claim about science and NOT a claim
of science.  Second, claims about multiple universes, tachyons
(sub-atomic particles that move faster than the speed of light,
apparently), etc. cannot be tested in the same sense in which natural
selection can be tested. Of course, these claims are inferences from
data. No problem. But so are claims about agency and their actions. For
example, I come across a stone in the desert that looks like
Socrates--it has his shape and features-- and I infer that it was not
the result of nature left to its own devices, that it is the result of
an agent. Now, the evidence is emprical, the inference logical, and the
notion (of an agent) conceptual. My point is this: these issues are
complicated, too complicated and too important to be left to people not
trained in the philosophy of science, logical theory, or the nature of
argument. That is, too important to be left to scientists. Of course, as
I noted above, there are scientists who are sympathetic to ID.
 
Pardon any grammatical or spelling errors. I'm writing this quickly at
the gym at Baylor.  
 
Thanks for your interest in my work. Please read it. It's on my website,
for free. And, to quote the Beatles, "that can't be bad."
 
Frank