Section 4(g) of RLUIPA

[Eric W. Treene]

 The analysis of 4(g) below is from Rep. Canady's analysis (Canady was
chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Constitution) in the Congressional
Record.  This legislative history can be found at
http://www.rluipa.com/generaldocs/HouseLegisHistory-Part3.html

Section 4(g). If a claimant proves an effect on commerce in
     a particular case, the courts assume or infer that all
     similar effects will, in the aggregate, substantially affect
     commerce. This section gives government an opportunity to
     rebut that inference. Government may show that even in the
     aggregate, there is no substantial effect on commerce. Such
     an opportunity to rebut the usual inference is not
     constitutionally required, but is provided to create an extra
     margin of constitutionality in potentially difficult cases.
     This section had no equivalent in H.R. 1691.



Eric Treene
The Becket Fund



-----Original Message-----
From: A.E. Brownstein
To: RELIGIONLAW at listserv.ucla.edu
Sent: 1/3/02 3:14 PM
Subject: Section 4(g) of RLUIPA

        Does anyone know if and where there is legislative history
explaining why
Section 4(g) of RLUIPA is in the Act, what it means, and what it was
intended to accomplish? The government in a current RLUIPA case is
arguing
that 4(g) unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the existence
of
a jurisdictional element from the plaintiff to the government. I am told
this is wrong. The provision is actually supposed to help the
government.
Does anyone know where I might find legislative history that bears on
this
issue? I don't know if anyone else is interested in this so responses
off
list might be more appropriate.

Alan Brownstein
UC Davis School of Law