Scalia

[Robin Charlow]

He was asked about not using legislative history for statutory
interpretation during a visit to Hofstra some years ago.  His response
was that it is relevant because it is some indication of what people
generally (just coincidentally, some of those who voted on the measure)
think statutory terms mean--in the way a dictionary of the period is
relevant in defining statutory terms--but that it's so manipulated as to
be unreliable.  Perhaps, though I've never heard him say this, he finds
constitutional history less manipulated, and therefore a more accurate
indicator of the general understanding of constitutional terms at the
time they were adopted?  I'm still not conceding he's consistent in
applying interpretative principles, but one could posit an explanation
for this principle, I suppose.

Robin Charlow
Hofstra University School of Law
Hempstead, New York  11549
email: lawrdc at hofstra.edu
phone (516) 463-5166

>>> Douglas Laycock <dlaycock at MAIL.LAW.UTEXAS.EDU> 02/24/00 07:12PM
>>>
        However Scalia rationalizes, the fact is he looks at
legislative history
on constitutional questions, generally using it to narrow the text, and
he
refuses to look at legislative history on statutory questions.  His
behavior is not consistent.


Douglas Laycock
University of Texas Law School
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX  78705
        512-232-1341 (phone)
        512-471-6988 (fax)
        dlaycock at mail.law.utexas.edu