Secular purpose

[Michael McConnell]

I agree with most of what Bob Destro has said on this
thread, but am not convinced when he says:
>
>      I think it is (fairly) easy to distinguish policies compelling or
>      prohibiting modes of worship, ritual, or expression. While there are
>      certainly close cases involving things that look like they might be
>      rituals (e.g., TM, or various "New Age" practices), most cases
>      involving ritual or worship are relatively easy to spot.

This may be true for affirmative conduct, but it is not
true, I fear, for refusing to act. Let me give three
examples:
(1) requiring someone to refrain from eating during the day
during Ramadan would appear to require them to
participate in a religious ritual (fasting)
(2) requiring someone to refrain from working on Sunday
is a slightly more difficult case since, as the Court
pointed out, there are some secular justifications for a
common day of rest,
(3) requiring someone to refrain from gambling,
drunkenness, adultery, abortion, slavery, cruelty to
animals, homosexual acts, or anything else thought to be
immoral is not, according to Destro, requiring them to
engage in a religious ritual.

But in all three cases, the person is not being required to
*do* anything, but to *refrain* from doing something. How
can they be distinguished, without getting into
complicated theological questions about the meaning of the
acts within the religious tradition? (I very
much hope there is a good answer to this question.)
-- Michael McConnell (U of Utah)