Secular Purpose -Reply

[Daniel Conkle]

I have tried to articulate and defend the basic distinction that Alan
and Doug describe, conceding that it is impossible to draw a bright
line.  See 42 DePaul L. Rev. 339 (1992); 10 J. L. & Relig. 1 (1994).

To (over)simplify:  For the government to advance what I call a
"spiritual" purpose is not only demeaning to religious (and
irreligious) dissenters, but also, I would argue, entirely
unnecessary; thus, it amounts to a gratuitous insult to the
dissenters.  By contrast, governmental action may be essential in
confronting what I call "worldly" problems; in this context, to
*exclude* religious grounds, as opposed to moral viewpoints of some
other derivation, is exceedingly difficult to defend.

Dan Conkle
********************************
Daniel O. Conkle
Professor of Law
Indiana University School of Law
Bloomington, Indiana  47405
(812) 855-4331
e-mail conkle at indiana.edu or
danconkle at law.indiana.edu
********************************

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Alan Brownstein asks:

>        Does it matter whether the law requires requires people to
engage
in what
>some might consider to be a religious ritual as opposed to requiring
>obedience to a religious/moral command? If it does, are we confident
that
>we can distinguish the two?


        It seems to me that this must matter, and no, I am not
confident we
can distinguish the two.  But compulsory religious ritual or
observance is
clearly at the core of the Establishment Clause.  Moral rules have
for
centuries been the concern of both governments and religions.




Douglas Laycock
University of Texas Law School
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX  78705
        512-471-3275 (voice)
        512-471-6988 (fax)
        dlaycock at mail.law.utexas.edu

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