DOMA and Religion
Gaffney, Edward
egaffney at PLUTO.PEPPERDINE.EDU
Wed Feb 18 16:02:00 PST 1998
The secular purpose requirement was stated succinctly in The Williamsburg
Charter, a bicentennial document celebrating religious freedom: "`Secular
purpose' should not mean `non-religious purpose' but `general public
purpose.'" "The Williamsburg Charter," 8 J. L. & Relig. 5, 14 (1990). Too
succinctly for purposes of Bob's question. But at least this understanding
challenges the identification of secular purpose with non-religion. Ed
Gaffney
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From: Robert Destro
To: RELIGIONLAW
Subject: DOMA and Religion
Date: Wednesday, February 18, 1998 5:05PM
The problem I have with this discussion is the basic problem I have with
the "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon test itself: it is an
incomprehensible exercise in characterization unless one first defines
one's operative terms.
Andy Koppelman's argument about the religious/secular divide rests upon
the Supreme Court's "traditionalist" approach to the definition of
"religion" in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This is problematic
for several reasons:
1) The Court has never deigned to tell us what "secular" means.
2) The only rational way to define the term under the Establishment
Clause case law is secular="non-religious"
3) The Court uses at least two definitions of "religion". The EC
definition looks to "traditional" religious indicia: ritual, sacred text,
etc. The FX definition looks to the role of the belief in the spiritual
universe of the believer.
4) Both the pro and anti-DOMA views rest on differing perspectives on
"the good".
5) What I would like to hear from Andy is an explanation of the
following:
a) what does he mean by "secular"?
b) why should his views on the "proper" (moral?) treatment of same-sex
unions be viewed as any less "religious" than (say) Rick Duncan's?
Bob Destro
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert A. Destro Destro at law.edu
Columbus School of Law 202-319-5202
The Catholic University of America fax:202-319-4498
Washington, D.C. 20064-8005 http://www.law.edu
In effect, he argues that the justification for DOMA must be made in
non-"traditional definition of religion" terms.
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