Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the Federal Leavings of RFRA

Thomas C. Berg tcberg at SAMFORD.EDU
Tue Apr 28 18:00:26 PDT 1998


The precise issue seems to be:  When a speedy and effective
refund remedy is available in state court, would it be a
"substantial burden" on religious practice for the
religious taxpayer to be denied an injunction and have to
wait?

I would guess that in most cases, courts would say no
(especially if the taxpayer has no doctrinal objection to
paying the tax.)  But there might be a substantial burden
under some facts:  for example, if the particular tax
burden is so great as to drive the religious entity out of
business before even a speedy state court remedy can be
provided.  Didn't even *Jimmy Swaggart* leave open the
possibility that a generally applicable tax levy that wiped
out the religious activity might be a "constitutionally
significant" burden?

Which raises a question about the Anti-Injunction Act,
whose answer I don't know:  Is the effectiveness of the
state remedy for purposes of the Act determined by its
general effectiveness, or rather by the circumstances of
the particular taxpayer?  That is, if the tax would be so
great as to drive the particular entity out of business,
would the refund remedy be deemed ineffective, and an
injunctive action permitted, on those facts even though the
refund remedy was generally speedy and effective?

Tom Berg
Cumberland Law School, Samford University


On Tue, 28 Apr 1998 14:42:07 EDT JMH ACLJ <JMHACLJ at AOL.COM>
wrote:

> The anti-injunction act bars federal courts from enjoining, suspending or
> restraining taxes or levies under state law if a plain, efficient and speedy
> remedy is available under state law.
>
> The federal leavings of Religious Freedom Restoration Act bar a federal actor
> from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the
> burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the federal actor
> "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -(1) is in
> furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
> restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
>
> Did Congress modify the provisions of the anti-injunction act when it enacted
> RFRA?
>
> What is the nature of the modification that Congress worked?
>
> Consider the following example:  UBN (Unity Broadcasting Network) applies for,
> but is denied a state property tax exemption available for places of religious
> worship and instruction; UBN applied for the exemption for its studio and
> tower property, from which it produces and broadcasts 24 hours a day of
> religious worship and instruction.  UBN may challenge the denial of the
> property tax exemption in state court; challenging in federal court, using a
> 1983 mode, would raise the spectre of attorneys fees awards, damages, and but
> for the anti-injunction act, injunctive relief.
>
> Does RFRA modify the tax antijunction act in a way that would make injunctive
> relief available through the federal district courts, even though state law
> provides for some form of plain, speedy and efficient remedy?
>
> Obviously the strictures of RFRA do not bind the state or local taxing
> authority.  But does RFRA prohibit the federal judge from substantially
> burdening UBN's religion by refusing to issue injunctive relief on the basis
> only of the anti-injunction act?
>
> Jim Henderson
> Senior Counsel
> ACLJ

-----------------------------------------
Thomas C. Berg, Cumberland Law School
Samford University
Email: tcberg at samford.edu



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