RFRA and contractual obligations -Reply

[Daniel Conkle]

Please forgive me if I missed it, but it seems to me that--although a
number of interesting points have been made--there has been little
attempt to connect the analysis of this problem to the actual terms
of RFRA, i.e., "substantial burden," "compelling interest," etc.  Is
it not a substantial burden to violate one's religious beliefs in
order to fulfill a contractual obligation that one mistakenly agreed
to?  Is the religious person's other option, i.e., paying contractual
damages, not such a burden?  If there is a substantial burden, is
there a "compelling" interest in requiring the person to at least pay
damages for the contractual violation?  Is this "compelling interest"
present in every case, e.g., a generalized "compelling interest"
based on the general importance of enforcing contractual obligations,
or does the analysis depend on the particular subject and context of
each particular contract?  Or are the terms of RFRA ill-suited to
this inquiry, perhaps like religious speech claims seem to be?

Dan Conkle
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Daniel O. Conkle
Professor of Law
Indiana University School of Law
Bloomington, Indiana  47405
(812) 855-4331
e-mail Conkle at indiana.edu or
danconkle at law.indiana.edu
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