Injunctions justified partly by picketers' display of gruesome pictures

[Volokh, Eugene]

	I'm inclined to say that restrictions on picketing, justified by
a concern that the gruesomeness of the pictures that the picketers have
displayed shocked children, are content-based, and likely
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.  Thus, for instance, say that
antiwar protesters are protesting outside a church, arguing that the
church's backing of pro-war ideologies is helping contribute to the
carnage, and displaying posters of dead civilians.  An injunction
against such protesting justified by a desire to protect children from
the disturbing posters would be constitutional.

	Oddly, St. John's Church v. Scott, 2008 WL 3877826 (Colo. App.),
http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=6773&courtid=1,
treats the purpose of "protect[ing] children who were present" against
the display of gruesome posters (posters that were "highly disturbing to
both adults and children in the congregation because of their
gruesomeness or goriness apart from any message intended to be
conveyed") as content-neutral.  "Frightening and gruesome images of dead
bodies are a method of communicating a viewpoint.  Consequently,
restriction of such methods to protect children does not restrict the
communication of the viewpoint itself.  Therefore, we conclude that
protection of children from the undeniably gruesome pictures at issue
here is a proper content-neutral purpose."

	I take it that this is just a basic and not uncommon confusion
between viewpoint-neutrality and content-neutrality -- though the images
are disturbing without regard to the viewpoint they convey, it is their
communicative content (their representing dead human bodies, rather than
just random splotches of red on paper) that makes them disturbing.  And
I take it that the fact that the injunction is justified by this
communicative impact requires strict scrutiny.  Am I missing something
here?  Thanks,

	Eugene