Requirements to pay money to ideological group vs. requirements to personally help ideological group

[jfn]

Isn't there an expressive  aspect  of the contribution to the union 
or bar-- a suggestion of affinity-- that is lacking in the 
"contribution" to the general tax fund. Still more clearly, isn't 
there an expressive quality to the refusal to pay union or bar dues-- 
manifest dissent. While the refusal to pay taxes is every bit as 
expressive, the government's levy is, in the main, content-neutral, 
and inarguably serves a compelling  government interest that the shop 
rule and mandatory bar membership is lacking.

I would approach the hypothetical the same way. While the provision 
of services to the church may say nothing at all about the provider's 
religious views, the refusal to take the church's money is an 
apparent act of conscience, which the government cannot stifle unless 
the mandate is content-neutral-- requiring the provision of service 
to every kind of religious and secular organization on a sort of 
common carrier  basis-- and in service of a compelling government 
interest, which would be what-- in furtherance of religious liberty?!

John Noble

At 3:42 PM -0700 4/21/08, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
>	I've long thought Abood and Keller were wrong, and that there's
>no constitutionally significant difference between (1) having to pay
>money to a union or state bar that would use the money for ideological
>purposes, (2) having to pay money to the government's general tax fund,
>which would use the money for ideological purposes, and (3) having to
>pay money to the government's general tax fund, which would then pay it
>to a union or state bar that would use the money for ideological
>purposes.  Option 2 is constitutionally permissible; 3 must be as well;
>and I can't see why 1 should be any different.
>
>	Yet let's take as given Abood's and Keller's unanimous holdings
>that the government generally may not require people to pay money to
>ideological groups when that money will be used for ideological
>expression that the payers disapprove of.  May the government then
>require people to provide services to such groups, when the services
>will be used to help in ideological expression that the payers
>disapprove of?
>
>	Say, for instance, that a church wants to buy services from a
>small business -- say, catering services, event photography services, or
>for that matter electrical repair work.  The business refuses, because
>it disapproves of the church's religious views.  The church then sues on
>the grounds that the business's actions violated state public
>accommodation discrimination law (assume that, as the New Mexico Human
>Rights Commission concluded, service businesses are generally covered
>public accommodations).  May the business claim a First Amendment right
>not to help -- through work (even fully compensated work) rather than
>money -- in the dissemination of views that it disapproves of?
>
>	Eugene
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