A Note on Vetoes

Sat Dec 22 20:37:17 PST 2007

We could try an amendment requiring consultation with a shrink before  
invading another country, but perhaps I should see a shrink for even  
suggesting such a thing...

rs

On Dec 22, 2007, at 7:06 PM, guayiya wrote:

> maybe we should think aspirationally and write a constitution for a  
> world without war.
> ridiculous, huh?
>
> Daniel Hoffman
>
> Robert Sheridan wrote:
>> Whether bicameralism or veto, the net result of these and other  
>> obstacles is that neither side in the polarized political world  
>> that is America today can pull the country its way for long (one  
>> may hope, whistling past the graveyard.
>>
>> Can you imagine the damage if any of the various manias with which  
>> this country is afflicted were allowed to dig themselves in  
>> permanently, apart from the ones that already have?
>>
>> I hope it's not too late and that we can look forward with  
>> confidence to genuine democratic elections in the near future,  
>> although I must admit that if we have difficulty trusting  
>> politicians we should have even more difficulty trusting the voters  
>> who put them in positions where they can do harm.
>>
>> We have met the enemy and we're still having difficulty dealing  
>> with ourselves.
>>
>> On a more-or-less different point entirely, Richard Rhodes, who  
>> writes about the difficulties of the nuclear age in his new book,  
>> "The Arsenals of Folly," (Knopf, 2007), suggests a new locus of  
>> sovereignty, apart from the ones we've all read about:  the monarch  
>> in a monarchy, Parliament in Britain (as I understand it), and the  
>> people (here, allegedly).
>>
>> In discussing the fall of the Soviet Union into its constituent  
>> republics, Rhodes suggests that sovereignty lay in which new  
>> national leader (of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Byelorus, or the  
>> Baltic States, etc.) succeeded in obtaining control of the suitcase  
>> (or football, in our parlance) containing the triggering codes for  
>> launching nuclear missiles located in various of these republics.   
>> That leader was Boris Yeltsin, succeeded by his nominee Vladimir  
>> Putin, who 'Time' now labels 'Tsar.'
>>
>> The reason for the 'more-or-less' qualification, above, is that the  
>> 42 year period  of the Cold War (1949-1991) marked a time when a  
>> certain mania seemed to overwhelm both sides to that conflict,  
>> namely that each side (mistakenly, if you believe the evidence  
>> cited by Rhodes) believed that the other was intent on taking the  
>> first nuclear shot, given the chance, and no amount of argument or  
>> evidence could persuade either side differently.  Hence MAD.
>>
>> The inability of our crazies, and theirs, to take that shot, speaks  
>> well of the fact that it is exceedingly difficult to pull this  
>> country too far off course, whatever that course may happen to be.
>>
>> MacArthur, as I recall, wanted permission to take that shot across  
>> the Yalu River on Korea's northern border, to China, which Truman,  
>> who had some nuclear experience and who may not have enjoyed it as  
>> much as his confidence suggested, declined to grant, recalling the  
>> general to much local-in-time consternation.
>>
>> rs
>> sfls
>>
>> On Dec 22, 2007, at 2:56 PM, guayiya wrote:
>>
>>> Those who wish it were easier to legislate would do well to focus  
>>> on an obstacle far greater than the veto: bicameralism.
>>> Daniel Hoffman
>>>
>>> Mark Graber wrote:
>>>> An historical note on vetoes, which may be worth nothing.
>>>>
>>>> 1. The most sustained use of the veto as a policy instrument may  
>>>> be the use by Jacksonian presidents from 1832 to 1860 to prevent  
>>>> internal improvements and the national bank.  Who was right on  
>>>> this one is still a matter of historical controversy.
>>>>
>>>> 2. The most political controversial were Johnson's vetoes of  
>>>> Civil Rights measures.  Whether you should base anything on this  
>>>> might be called into doubt.  Johnson, after all, was an  
>>>> accidental president, who was actually of a different political  
>>>> party.  This is, of course, a risk our system runs, but I would  
>>>> not base a constitution on this.
>>>>
>>>> 3. The executive veto has become far more prominent in the era of  
>>>> near permanent divided government.  For the most part during this  
>>>> period, Republicans and Democrats got about the same combined  
>>>> number of votes (if you add presidential and congressional votes-- 
>>>> no doubt I am off by a percentage or two).
>>>>
>>>> 4. My sense of the universe is that the veto is another  
>>>> instrument that makes legislation more difficulty.  The best  
>>>> reason for bding opposed to the thing is that 21st century  
>>>> governments should be able to legislative more easily and more  
>>>> radically than can government in the United States.
>>>>
>>>> Mark A. Graber
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>> "Sanford Levinson" <SLevinson at law.utexas.edu> 12/22/07 5:24 PM  
>>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>>>
>>>> Bobby asks a good question (of course).  It's true that I am  
>>>> somewhat
>>>> disdainful of the bona fides of the President because of the
>>>> circumstances of election through the electoral college--and I'm  
>>>> quite
>>>> willing to set aside, at least for the moment, Bush v. Gore in  
>>>> favor of
>>>> the more fundamental fact that we so regularly bring to the White  
>>>> House
>>>> presidents who lack demonstrable majority support.  (The clearest
>>>> examples in the post-War era are Nixon (1968) and Clinton (1992),  
>>>> both
>>>> of whom received approximately 43% of the popular vote.)  But  
>>>> even if
>>>> we're talking about people with majority support, and even if we
>>>> recognize the reality of the institutionalized presidency, it still
>>>> boils down to the fact that a single individual, self-described  
>>>> "Great
>>>> Decider" or not, can countermand the more-or-less deliberate  
>>>> judgment of
>>>> majorities, sometimes fairly hefty ones, of both the House and the
>>>> Senate.  Even if one admits, as I indeed emphasize, that each  
>>>> member of
>>>> Congress is quite parochial, because of constituency interests, I'm
>>>> willing to defend the proposition that bills that can pass both  
>>>> houses
>>>> are at least as likely to represent some (perhaps mythic "national
>>>> interest") as the views of a single individual.  Cass Sunstein's
>>>> forthcoming book discusses the virtues of group decisionmaking in  
>>>> the
>>>> context of the Concorcet theorem.  I know there are problems with  
>>>> the
>>>> direct analogy, but I'm tempted by the argument that even if the
>>>> President, for some reason or another, is likely to be wiser and  
>>>> more
>>>> discerning of the national interest than any given member of  
>>>> Congress,
>>>> it doesn't follow at all that the President, unless one imputes  
>>>> almost
>>>> literally God-like omnisceience, is likely to be wiser than the
>>>> collective wisdom of Congress.
>>>>
>>>> And, as I hope I've made clear, for all of my rantings about the
>>>> iniquities of the Bush Administration, my arguments are designed to
>>>> apply to future presidents, including ones that I like considerably
>>>> more.  I see no good reason why a President Obama or Clinton  
>>>> should be
>>>> able to countermand a Republican Congress, other than my own  
>>>> partisan
>>>> preferences, which isn't a good enough argument.  The only really
>>>> "principled" argument in favor of the policy-based veto (for  
>>>> we're not
>>>> talking right now about Constitution-based vetoes based on the
>>>> President's duty to enforce the Constitution) is a general  
>>>> aversion to
>>>> legislation and the belief that anything that lessens the amount of
>>>> legislation is a good thing, let the chips fall where they may.   
>>>> I can
>>>> understand the argument, but I disagree with its premise.
>>>>
>>>> sandy
>>>>
>>>> ________________________________
>>>>
>>>> From: conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu
>>>> [mailto:conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of RJLipkin at aol.com
>>>> Sent: Saturday, December 22, 2007 3:22 PM
>>>> To: CONLAWPROF at lists.ucla.edu
>>>> Subject: Re: Levinson on Bill Moyers' Journal
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>         When I first read the book I was skeptical about his  
>>>> argument
>>>> casting the presidential veto as undemocratic. Last night's  
>>>> interview
>>>> cured my skepticism to some degree.  I still have a question  
>>>> though: Is
>>>> Sandy's quarrel with the presidential veto based primarily on input
>>>> issues--how the president is selected--or output issues--how one  
>>>> person,
>>>> even a democratically accountable person (at least in his or her  
>>>> first
>>>> term) can overturn legislation or be "bought" by special  
>>>> interests? Or
>>>> both? Alternatively stated, if the electoral college was  
>>>> eliminated and
>>>> presidents were selected through direct elections, would that at  
>>>> least
>>>> reduce the undemocratic dimension surrounding the veto or is the  
>>>> bulk of
>>>> the argument against the veto about what the president does-- 
>>>> however
>>>> elected--once office.
>>>>
>>>> Bobby
>>>>
>>>> Robert Justin Lipkin
>>>> Professor of Law
>>>> Widener University School of Law
>>>> Delaware
>>>>
>>>> Ratio Juris, Contributor:  http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/
>>>> <http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/>
>>>> Essentially Contested America, Editor-In-Chief
>>>> http://www.essentiallycontestedamerica.org/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ________________________________
>>>>
>>>> See AOL's top rated recipes
>>>> <http://food.aol.com/top-rated-recipes? 
>>>> NCID=aoltop00030000000004>  and
>>>> easy ways to stay in shape
>>>> <http://body.aol.com/fitness/winter-exercise?NCID=aoltop00030000000003 
>>>> >
>>>> for winter.
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> To post, send message to Conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu
>>>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof
>>>>
>>>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be  
>>>> viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read  
>>>> messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and  
>>>> list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to  
>>>> others.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> <guayiya.vcf>_______________________________________________
>>> To post, send message to Conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu
>>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/conlawprof
>>>
>>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed  
>>> as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages  
>>> that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list  
>>> members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>>
> <guayiya.vcf>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/conlawprof/attachments/20071222/0c385c8b/attachment.htm 