The First Amendment and rejection of a potential countyDirectorof Schools

Mark Graber MGRABER at gvpt.umd.edu
Wed Nov 22 11:11:47 PST 2006


I confess to thinking that speech at a religious service is almost
always off-limits, unless there is a compelling interest.  Of course,
religious organizations do a great many things, and one might argue that
the talk I give on Brandeis before the Temple Brotherhood is not really
a religious meeting and, without deciding the issue, I think the
argument is reasonable.  So one may raise a good many questions about
the person who gives a speech endorsing a candidate at a meeting
sponsored by a religious organization.  But what people say at prayer
meetings, I believe, cannot be relevant to their standing in the secular
community without violating the free exercise clause.

MAG

>>> "Volokh, Eugene" <VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu> 11/22/06 1:53 PM >>>
	Well, recall that Scarbrough neither belongs to such a
religion,
not was designed the position because he belonged to the religion (in
the sense that the government's actions were caused by his *religious
affiliation* or even by the religious nature of his speech).

	Rather, the government rejected him because of his speech,
apparently not much caring whether it was to a religious group.  Would
there be a Free Exercise Clause violation if, for instance, the
government disciplines an employee (on Hatch-Act-type grounds) for
giving a speech endorsing a political candidate, where the speech
happened to be at a religious meeting?  I would think, given Smith,
that
this would either be a pure Free Speech Clause case or, if it were a
Free Exercise Clause case, it would be so only because of the hybrid
rights doctrine.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Howard Schweber [mailto:schweber at polisci.wisc.edu] 
> Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2006 10:48 AM
> To: Volokh, Eugene; conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu 
> Subject: RE: The First Amendment and rejection of a potential 
> countyDirectorof Schools
> 
> 
> 
> I am very confused, here.  If my religion teaches that 
> homosexuality is acceptable, and then I am denied a position 
> because I belong to a religion that teaches that 
> homosexuality is acceptable, how is that not an infringement 
> on my Free Exercise rights?  Just because some other, 
> non-religious people hold the same view for non-religious reasons?
> 
> hs
> 
> 
> At 10:12 AM 11/22/2006 -0800, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
> >         The chief claim that the panel discusses is a Free Speech 
> >Clause claim; Scarbrough also raised a Free Exercise Clause 
> claim, but 
> >the panel treats it the same as a Free Speech Clause claim.
> >
> >         My sense is that there's no Lukumi-like 
> discrimination based 
> >on religion or religiosity here; there's good reason to think board

> >members disapproved of Scarbrough's implicit endorsement of 
> >homosexuality as proper behavior, but little to think that they 
> >disapproved of his speech because of its religious context.  So if 
> >there's a Free Exercise Clause violation, it would 
> presumably be some 
> >sort of hybrid-rights violation, triggered partly by the 
> Free Speech Clause.
> >
> >         By the way, sorry for not posting a link to the 
> decision; it's 
> >http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0434p-06.pdf .
> >
> >         Eugene
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu 
> > > [mailto:conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Mark Graber
> > > Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2006 10:07 AM
> > > To: Volokh, Eugene; conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu 
> > > Subject: Re: The First Amendment and rejection of a potential 
> > > countyDirector of Schools
> > >
> > > Is this first amendment speech or first amendment religion.
> > >
> > > Would a school board be allowed to reject a candidate for 
> anything 
> > > on the ground that the candidate belonged to a religious society

> > > that accepted gay and lesbian members?
> > >
> > > Mark A. Graber
> > >
> > > >>> "Volokh, Eugene" <VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu> 11/22/06 1:01 PM >>>
> > >       In Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Ed., decided today by

> > > the Sixth Circuit, Scarbrough had been the elected 
> superintendent of 
> > > a county school system.  The elected position expired by law, and

> > > was replaced with an appointed position, Director of Schools; 
> > > Scarbrough was one of the candidates for that position.  
> The county 
> > > Board of Education then rejected him, allegedly because he had 
> > > agreed to say a prayer at a breakfast hosted by a church with a 
> > > predominantly gay and lesbian membership (the 
> Metropolitan Community 
> > > Church).
> > >
> > >       The Sixth Circuit held that the rejection violated 
> the First 
> > > Amendment, and I think that has to be right as to most government

> > > employees.  But the Circuit didn't consider whether the 
> position of 
> > > Director of Schools is the sort of high-level 
> policymaking position 
> > > that elected officials may fill even based on the candidate's 
> > > otherwise protected speech or political association.  It 
> seems to me 
> > > pretty clear that a Governor, for instance, would be free 
> to appoint 
> > > a state Secretary of Education based on the appointee's party 
> > > affiliation or his otherwise protected speeches to various groups

> > > that many voters disapprove of -- such decisions may be 
> > > narrow-minded, or improper pandering to public prejudices, but I

> > > take it that under Elrod and Branti they would be 
> constitutional (or 
> > > do Elrod and Branti limit themselves only to decisions based on 
> > > party affiliation and not based on speech?).  Is Director 
> of Schools 
> > > a sufficiently high-level position to qualify as well?
> > >
> > >       (Scarbrough never did give the speech, but I agree with the

> > > court that this shouldn't change the First Amendment analysis.)
> > >
> > >       Eugene
> > > _______________________________________________
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