Our dubious Constitution (continued)
crossf at mail.utexas.edu
Sat Mar 18 10:00:16 PST 2006
I can see the advantages of a removal system, depending on how it works.
But I think presidential government is better than parliamentary
government, and I think the empirical evidence supports this for advanced
nations (perhaps not developing nations).
How would you structure such an interim removal system in a presidential
system? I doubt that even a relaxed simple majority impeachment system
would be used much, but it might be a start. Would the vice president take
over? Or would we call a new election? Or have some other method for
picking the new president?
At 11:46 AM 3/18/2006, Sanford Levinson wrote:
>I note, FWIW, the lead editorial in this week's Economist, which basically
>calls for Tony Blair to step down unless he truly believes that he can
>push through some of what the Economist (and presumably Blair) believe are
>"necessary" reforms. Otherwise, they argue, he should give Gordon Brown
>the chance to establish his own personal as PM before the next election.
>The main point I would make is that there is no tone of crisis at all in
>the editorial. It's a sober analysis of the kind of leadership the UK
>(and the Labour Party) need in the next couple of y ears and a tentative
>conclusion that he is unlikely to provide it. One can agree or disagree,
>but it's "par for the course" in the UK. And, presumably, at some point
>Labourites themselves might start initiating a change in leadership, not
>least because Blair's most recent legislation, on education, got
>throughonly with Tory support. I'm not at all sure that British
>parliamentarianism ,coupled with sovereignty-limiting membership in the EU
>(and, of course, recognition of the authority of the European Court on
>Human Rights), doesn't provide an optimal solution. Given all of the
>emphasis on American states as "little laboratories of experimentation,"
>it's a real shame that none of them decided to go a parliamentary route
>and that only Nebraska has demonstrated the possibility of an alternative
>To post, send message to Conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu
>To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
>private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
>posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or
>wrongly) forward the messages to others.
McCombs School of Business
The University of Texas at Austin
1 University Station B6000
Austin, TX 78712-1178
More information about the Conlawprof