Intentional infliction of emotional distress tort post-Hustler-v.-Falwell

[Lynne Henderson]

It was ironic, but it is a direct quote from a case as well, where it 
was used seriously.  The illegitimacy is indeed tied to the context.  I 
should have been more clear about the concern that the language 
regarding homosexuality could be offensive.
Lynne Henderson

On Jun 9, 2006, at 11:34 AM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:

> 	I'm assuming the response about the vagueness is facetious; and
> it still leaves me wondering whether there might be a serious, perhaps
> constitutionally fatal, vagueness problem here.
>
> 	As to the intent to cause distress, that's common in many
> picketing contexts.  The stronger argument, I take it, is that the
> distress is especially likely to be illegitimate when it's funeral
> picketing that harshly condemns the deceased -- but again, even if this
> can support a content-neutral and narrow funeral picketing ordinance,
> can it really support a potentially content-based distress tort in 
> which
> the jury must make an ad hoc judgment of "outrageousness"?
>
> 	Finally, I don't think the problem here is that recognizing the
> tort would "imply it is somehow outrageous to be impliedly called a
> homosexual"; the plaintiffs' claims don't rest on the theory that the
> defendants are impliedly calling their late son a homosexual.
>
> 	Eugene