The Left, patriotism, and threats to the constitutionalorder

[RJLipkin at aol.com]

With respect to my position  at least, I think Eugene's remarks are 
inapposite. The notion of "American  patriotism" might be ambiguous like "fascism," but 
that's not my  complaint.  (Indeed, I don't think our quarrels about 
"fascism" are  typically over its meaning.  Instead, I think it's over its application 
 which often assumes a particular meaning but quarrels over who deserves to 
be  included in the class of fascists.) The logical form of "fascism" and 
"American  patriotism" are different.  The latter requires, inter alia an  object 
of commitment, and that object needs to be specified and defended.
 
        Similarly, characterizing  patriotism as the "love of one's country 
-- in this instance, the USA -- and not  of some abstract attachment to 
constitutional principles of which the most  emotionally salient ones (liberty and 
equality, not the Electoral College or  even federalism) are aspired to in many 
countries" misses the point in two  central ways: (1) what is the USA in 
contradistinction to "some abstract  attachment to constitutional principles"? and 
(2) the fact that other countries  aspire to liberty and equality is 
irrelevant to these critical terms in their  instantiation in American history. If 
these concepts are the objects  of my patriotism it is not a commitment to the 
French pursuit of liberty and  equality, but the American pursuit.  These 
concepts can be regarded  abstractly as professional political philosophers do or 
concretely  as American constitutionalists and more importantly American citizens 
do.  My commitment to these values involves the story of our independence 
from the  domination of a particular monarch and the struggle against an 
abhorrent form of  social and economic organization, slavery. I value abstract liberty 
and equality  highly, but my commitment to the instantiation of these 
concepts in  American forms of life might be something for which I am willing do die.
 
        Eugene and I differ in that  he is committed to what he calls "love 
of nation," and he seems to desire to  leave that as a primitive term, an 
unanalyzed given.  Indeed, it seems,  although I might have misread him here, that 
patriotism as love of nation  derives its value, for Eugene, precisely because 
it is an unanalyzable  given. So in the end, the problem is not so much that 
"American patriotism" is  ambiguous, or that its object must be specified.  
Rather, the difference,  at least between Eugene's view and my own, is that he 
regards patriotism to be  love of country, and contends that someone who asks 
for more, misunderstands  that patriotism is a primitive term and its special 
force derives from its  status as a primitive term. I, on the other hand, have 
seen patriotism as a  primitive term used as a bludgeon. And indeed, insisting 
on unanalyzable givens,  by its very nature, lends itself to such use. 
Therefore, my notion of the logic  of patriotism insists of rejecting patriotism as 
an unanalyzable given, and to  insist that the term is unhelpful without 
specifying its object.
 
        The gulp here is  wide.  Because just when I ask for the object of a 
proposed conception of  patriotism or assert that my sense of patriotism 
refers to a commitment to the  contextual development of certain values in a 
particular historical setting,  Eugene seems to be saying that asking form such 
answers is precisely what misses  the point of patriotism because in his view 
patriotism as love of nation is to  be explicated no further. Although explication 
of any term or concept must come  to an end at some point, in my view, Eugene 
seems to reject the pursuit of  explicating the term "American patriotism" ab 
initio. While I resist  primitive terms in political and constitutional 
philosophy, at least as far as  possible, Eugene seems to insist that in this case 
one fails to understand  patriotism or patriotism as love of country if one 
requires analyzing its  meaning beyond its status as a primitive term.
 
        American patriotism as an  analytically sound constitutional 
term--one relevant to among other things  questions about secession--cannot do the 
work it's designed to do without first  deciding whether its a primitive term or 
not.  And if it's not, the  question of explicating its meaning is unavoidable.
 
Bobby

Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener  University School of Law
Delaware
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