Religious Views vs. Secular Views

Thu Oct 6 13:22:23 PDT 2005

I was struck by the switch from "truths" to "values" in Larry's criticism of
McConnell's statement. Are you talking about the same thing? Also, it does
not follow that McConnell is "ganz false" just because he doesn't embrace
the postmodernism (or what ever -ism is now in vogue) of recent intellectual
history. I take McConnell's statement to be, at least in part, a critique of
an antirealist epistemology where views can only be stated, not judged.

Greg Wallace
Campbell University School of Law

> From: "dr dow - univ." <ddow at uh.edu>
> Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2005 13:51:30 -0500
> To: <CONLAWPROF at lists.ucla.edu>
> Subject: Re: Religious Views vs. Secular Views
> 
> not only is mcconnell wrong,  as larry says, what he says is ganz
> false.  anyone who thinks that "truth is truth," that there are not
> religious truths and secular truths but only Truth itself, has missed at
> least a century's worth of intellectual history, and probably closer to
> three centuries' worth.  you can get a cliffs notes version of how wrong he
> is by reading today's nytimes story on the two groups of grand canyon
> rafters.  the story can be found at the following link:
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/science/sciencespecial2/06canyon.html?hp&ex=
> 1128657600&en=8fc8f41ec2ec6c4e&ei=5094&partner=homepage
> 
> i think it is obvious that if, instead of two groups of rafters, we had two
> groups of judges, there would be little doubt that they would decide many
> cases differently based precisely on their differing conceptions of truth.
> 
> At 01:19 PM 10/6/2005 -0500, Lawrence Solum wrote:
>> Surely McConnell is wrong about this.  One of the important features
>> of religious conceptions is that they are sources of moral values,
>> which may (or may not) differ from values derived from secular
>> conceptions of value.
>> 
>> To take a nonreligious example first.  Utilitarians and deontologists
>> may reach differing conclusions about personal choices or public
>> policy based on different value premises.
>> 
>> LIkewise, particular religious conceptions of moral value may lead to
>> conclusions that differ from conclusions derived from particular
>> secular conceptions of moral value.
>> 
>> Some examples of this are clear.  For example, one might believe that
>> there is a moral obligation to engage in particular forms of worship
>> based on religious premises, and also believe that if one's premises
>> are limited to nonreligious values, then no such obligation can be
>> supported.
>> 
>> There is another layer of complexity here.  Some values can be
>> supported by "public reason," i.e. by public political values.  These
>> shared values may be affirmed by different persons for different
>> reasons.  Thus, a Kantian might affirm the liberty of conscience based
>> on the value of autonomy, while a believer might affirm the same value
>> based on the doctrine of free faith.  This fact creates the
>> possibility that persons who affirm a variety of religious and
>> philosophical views about the good and the right might nonetheless
>> agree on core political values.
>> 
>> I am not sure about the larger context of McConnell's assertion, but
>> read in isolation it is clearly false.
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/6/05, Rick Duncan <nebraskalawprof at yahoo.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Our discussion yesterday about whether Miers would allow her religious
>> views
>>> to govern her secular views about various social issues reminded me of
>>> something Mike McConnell wrote about a decade ago on this list. With some
>>> difficulty, I was able to locate a copy. Here is the money excerpt:
>>> 
>>> "There are not secular truths and religious truths, but only truths. To use
>>> a (perhaps facile) analogy, [to deny this] is like saying: when I use
>>> addition to add up these numbers, I get answer 'A' but when I use
>>> multiplication and other arithmetic tools, I get answer 'B.' Unless
>>> arithmetic is internally inconsistent, the person who reaches this
>>> conclusion should go back and perform the operations again. Similarly,
>>> unless truth is internally inconsistent, the person who thinks that secular
>>> arguments point in one direction and religious arguments in another should
>>> examine the conflict and find out where error lies."
>>> 
>>> I think Mike is right, and this is why it is so easy for me to say that I
>>> could swear under oath that my religious views would not govern my secular
>>> legal analysis as a judge. Truth is truth, and I don't ever think that
>>> religious reasoning points in one direction and secular reasoning in
>>> another.
>>> 
>>> My religious views on abortion are the same as my secular views on
>> abortion.
>>> As I view the issue, the truth about abortion is that it is the violent
>>> taking of an innocent human life. If my church decided tomorrow that the
>>> Bible teaches that abortion is morally acceptable, I would leave my church
>>> and seek out one that preached the truth about abortion. The same is true
>>> about marraige. If my church taught that homosexual marriage or group
>>> marriage is acceptable and good, I would leave my church, because that is
>>> not the truth about marriage and I want nothing to do with a church that
>>> lies about marriage.
>>> 
>>> And, of course, whether the Due Process Clause provides substantive
>>> protection for certain (but not all) liberties, has nothing at all to do
>>> with my faith. To me, Substantive Due Process is an oxymoron, so whether I
>>> like a liberty (economic liberty) or abhor one (abortion) is irrelevant,
>>> because neither the liberties I like, nor those I dislike, are protected
>>> substantively by the Due Process Clause. The fundamental liberty of
>>> democratic self-government is the source of the answer to the legal status
>>> of abortion and marriage and the economic autonomy of consenting adults.
>>> 
>>> Rick Duncan
>>> 
>>> Sanford Levinson <SLevinson at law.utexas.edu> wrote:
>>> Rick's answer makes a lot of sense with regard to abortion, but, obviously,
>>> that is not the only issue likely to become before the Supreme Court.  What
>>> about the state's right to kill.  I presume that he believes that capital
>>> punishment is constitutional.  But certainly the contemporary Catholic
>>> Church casts severe doubt on the morality of that position, and Justice
>>> Scalia has said that he would have to resign in the Church treated capital
>>> punishment as it does abortion.  What about the welfare state and the
>>> DeShaney view that the state has no obligations to take care of
>> anyone?  And
>>> so on.  Does Rick turn out to be a closet positivist, a la Holmes, so that
>>> constitutional interpreters should take a bath in "cynical acid" lest they
>>> infuse any moral views into their interpretation of the Constitution.  If
>>> so, then I would agree that it is irrelevant w! hat his religious views
>> are.
>>>  But then it makes it passing strange that Jay Sekulow would think it
>>> important that someone who shares "our views" would be joining the Court,
>>> unless he (or Rick) is simply talking about a role model who goes to church
>>> a lot and witnesses to Jesus as the Messiah (though, apparently, that
>>> witness has no social or political consequences save at the private realm).
>>> 
>>> sandy
>>> ________________________________
>>> From: conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu
>>> [mailto:conlawprof-bounces at lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of
>>> Rick Duncan
>>> Sent: Wednesday, October 05, 2005 9:47 AM
>>> To: CONLAWPROF at lists.ucla.edu
>>> Subject: Re: Miers's religious views
>>> 
>>> 
>>> My religious views are irrelevant to whether the Constitution contains a
>>> right to abortion. It does not. If it did--if the 14th Amendment said "No
>>> state shall enact any law restricting a woman's right to have an
>>> abortion"--as a judge I would have to protect that right (or recuse myself
>>> if I could not do so in good conscience).
>>> 
>>> But since the Constitution does not contain a right to abortion, my
>>> religious views are irrelevant to my faithfully interpreting the
>>> Constitution and its silence on abortion.
>>> 
>>> I can not speak to Miers' views about abortion, but I could truthfully
>>> testify under oath that my religious faith is irrelevant to my legal views
>>> about the abortion liberty and Roe. Indeed, my own views about the
>> wrongness
>>> of Roe go back to my pre-Christian life as a secular law professor who was
>>> an agnostic only because God was too irrelevant to me to bother to become a
>>> committed atheist. Just as Nat Hentoff is a pro-life atheist, I was once a
>>> pro-life agnostic/secularist. Becoming a Christian changed my life in many
>>> ways, but it did not alter my views about the Constitution. The
>> Constitution
>>> said nothing about abortion when I was an agnostic, and it still says
>>> nothing about abortion.
>>> 
>>> Rick Duncan
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> RJLipkin at aol.com wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>        Is Rick's recommendation that she "answer that her religious views
>>> are irrelevant to her work as a judge" strategic or that she should give
>>> this answer because she really believes it since, in Rick's view, it is
>>> true? If the latter can Christian conservatives opposed to abortion
>> take any
>>> solace in her appointment?  Wouldn't they then need to hope she has secular
>>> reasons for opposing abortion?
>>> 
>>> Bobby
>>> 
>>> Robert Justin Lipkin
>>> Professor of Law
>>> Widener University School of Law
>>> Delaware
>>> 
>>> Rick Duncan
>>> Welpton Professor of Law
>>> University of Nebraska College of Law
>>> Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
>>> 
>>> "When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or
>>> Mordred: middle things are gone." C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle
>>> 
>>> "I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or
>>> numbered." --The Prisoner
>>> 
>>> ________________________________
>>> Yahoo! for Good
>>> Click here to donate to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Rick Duncan
>>> Welpton Professor of Law
>>> University of Nebraska College of Law
>>> Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
>>> 
>>> "When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or
>>> Mordred: middle things are gone." C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle
>>> 
>>> "I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or
>>> numbered." --The Prisoner
>>> 
>>> ________________________________
>>> Yahoo! for Good
>>> Click here to donate to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.
>>> ________________________________
>>> Yahoo! for Good
>>> Click here to donate to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Lawrence Solum
>> John E. Cribbet Professor of Law
>> University of Illinois College of Law
>> 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue
>> Champaign, IL  61820-6909
>> 217.244.3960
>> lsolum at gmail.com
>> http://lsolum.blogspot.com
>> _______________________________________________
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> 
> David R. Dow
> Distinguished University Professor
> University of Houston Law Center
> 100 Law Center
> Houston, Texas 77204-6060
> 713-743-2171 (voice)
> 713-743-2131 (facsimile)
> 
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
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> 
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.
> Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can
> read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the
> messages to others.