Mier's religious views

[SIDLEMAN at wi.rr.com]

Sandy asks:

Why, exactly, are judges entitled to more "freedom" than, say, postal 
workers?  As we've discussed at length on earlier occasions, most of us 
would not recognize a right of a postal worker to refuse to deliver the 
NARAL Monthly on "conscientious objection" grounds, then why do we 
recognize a right of judges to opt out of their own job-description, 
especially if it has the consequence of placing burdens on their 
colleagues, who may have some of the same qualms they do but have a 
different conception of their role and/or may face the prospect of 
defeat in judicial elections by opponents who portray them as "pro-
abortion" rather than "conscientious judges"?

Response:

Because judges are supposed to be morally thoughtful individuals, 
engaged in an inherently discretionary activity (the act of judging), 
while postal workers are presumably engaged in a variety of ministerial 
tasks, so their personal views or moral sensibilities ought to be 
irrelevant from the outset.  Judges may be like legislators, but I hope 
we haven't reached the point where we can't distinguish them from 
postal workers!

Scott Idleman
Marquette University Law School
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