Obscenity, morality, and harm

Volokh, Eugene VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu
Tue Jun 14 12:57:02 PDT 2005


	I don't think this argument would (or should) go far.  While
obscenity law has sometimes been defended on "morality simpliciter"
grounds, it has also been quite sincerely defended on the grounds that
it leads to tangible harms.  Some argue that obscenity contributes to
men's viewing women as sex objects and thus leads to rape and sex
discrimination.  Others argue that obscenity exacerbates men's desire
for sexual variety, and thus tends to lead to more adultery (and
concomitant harm to children) and more promiscuity (and thus unwanted
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases).

	These aren't arguments about "morality simpliciter" or about the
government *interest* being "promotion of a moral code."  Rather, they
are arguments that obscenity law serves eminently legitimate, even very
important, government interests, and that it does so by blocking
materials that influence people towards harmful behavior.

	Naturally, one can disagree with the factual assertions at the
heart of obscenity law.  But unless obscenity is presumptively protected
speech, or unless it's presumptively protected by the sexual autonomy
right, it's up to legislatures to resolve such factual debates
(especially when the factual assertions are traditionally accepted and
empirically plausible, as I think they are).  So either obscenity is
covered by the First Amendment (which Miller rejected) or by the
Lawrence right, in which case it's those substantive rights are doing
the work.  Or it's covered by neither, in which case the "morality
simpliciter is not a legitimate, much less compelling, government
interest" argument doesn't help, because obscenity law can be defended
as serving a very different interest.  In either case, the "no morality
simpliciter" assertion, even if it is sound constitutional law on its
own terms, strikes me as not very useful to obscenity law's challengers.

	Eugene

Howard Wasserman writes:

> There could be a slightly different use of Lawrence, which 
> the District Judge in Extreme Associates: Morality 
> simpliciter is not a legitimate, much less compelling, 
> government interest.  Promotion of a moral code is the 
> significant interest underlying both the judicial decision to 
> read obscenity out of "the freedom of speech" and the various 
> legislative decisions to ban all obscenity, at least as it 
> pertains to adults (especially willing adults).  So Lawrence 
> could be used to establish either: 1) A broad conclusion that 
> obscenity is not categorically unprotected and everything 
> from Miller all the way back to Roth is wrong; obscenity as a 
> category is subject to regulation as indecent sexual 
> expression (and the mere offense of non-consenting adults is 
> not a basis for regulation).  Alternatively,  and more 
> narrowly, even if obscenity is more regulable than other 
> expression, the regulation cannot apply to the narrow sale to 
> willing adult viewers (the actualy holding in Extreme Associates).
> 
> 
> Howard Wasserman
> FIU College of Law
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Scott Gerber" <s-gerber at onu.edu>
> To: "Howard Schweber" <schweber at polisci.wisc.edu>
> Cc: "Volokh, Eugene" <VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu>; 
> <Conlawprof at lists.ucla.edu>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 2:08 PM
> Subject: Re: The future of obscenity law
> 
> 
> > The federal district court opinion that prompted my 
> question, United 
> > States v. Extreme Associates, assumed the material was 
> obscene.  The 
> > trial judge takes on Miller v. California.
> >
> > Scott
> >
> >
> > Howard Schweber wrote [snip]:
> > I believe it is the case, though, that all the attempts at 
> government 
> > regulation of the Internet thus far have foundered because they 
> > attempted to go beyond the regulation of obscene material to reach 
> > merely "indecent" material.  As Eugene observes, those 
> arguments are 
> > very far from over, but as a matter of straight doctrine I 
> don't think 
> > anything that has transpired thus far requires rethinking 
> the Miller 
> > categories.
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> >
> > Scott Gerber
> > Law College
> > Ohio Northern University
> > Ada, OH 45810
> > 419-772-2219
> > http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/gerber/
> > _______________________________________________
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> 


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