SCt's cert grant in Title II ADA case

[Tobias B. Wolff]

I guess that's part of the point -- how much of Wickard survives?

Morrison rendered Wickard unavailable where a statute seeks exclusively (or, primarily) to regulate "non-economic" activity (gender-motivated violence).

I guess what I'm asking is, does the need for a comprehensive remedy still have force in Commerce Clause analysis where the "non-economic activity" is neither the primary nor the
principal target of the statute, but simply a component (and, by hypothesis, an integrated component) of what the statute aims to regulate.

-- T

LoAndEd at AOL.COM wrote:

> Don't know whether Tobias Wolff's is the "type of argument that is cognizable under the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence," but wouldn't it appear to describe Wickard itself?
>
> Marty
>
> Tobias Wolf writes:
>
> Marty's post raises an interesting question.
>
>   Say that Congress enacts comprehensive legislation in a given field, like access for
>   the disabled in public facilities.  Assume that, considered in isolation and on a
>   case-by-case basis, the statute satisfies the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
>   many (even most) of its expected applications, but not all.   That is, assume that
>   most of the facilities that would be regulated by Title II are either "economic"
>   under Morrison, and hence subject to aggregation, or else contain a nexus to
>   interstate commerce; but that some do not.
>
>   If a challenge is brought by one of the small subset of facilities that, when
>   considered in isolation, is not regulable under the Commerce Clause, is it available
>   to the government to argue that the law must be comprehensive in its application in
>   order to be effective?   That is, can the government argue that allowing
>   non-economic, intrastate facilities to enjoy exemptions from the statute will
>   undermine its overall effectiveness, and hence that the Commerce Clause authority to
>   regulate the facilities that are clearly "economic" or "interstate" includes a power
>   to regulate the   intrastate facilities in order that the regulation of the former
>   not be undermined?  (One possible example among many: The disabled must enjoy access
>   to free local buses in order to take advantage of their access to airports and
>   railroads.)
>
>   Forget, for the moment, whether that argument is factually correct with respect to
>   Title II.  Is it a type of argument that is cognizable under the new Commerce Clause
>   jurisprudence?
>
>   -- T