[civpro] Thinking about detention [with apologies for cross p
bills at TJSL.EDU
Tue Jun 11 12:10:54 PDT 2002
The ABA's report <http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf> raises
similar questions, in the context of the Exec Order re the post-911 military
commissions--noting for example that:
"The President's order raises important issues of constitutional and
international law and policy. The language in the order makes its potential
reach quite broad and raises questions for which there is no clear,
controlling precedent. Many of the issues will come into clearer focus only
if and when more specific rules are drafted and a military commission is
convened for the trial of a particular individual."
As to your writ suspension question, the Report states that:
"Notwithstanding the broad nature of this language [Exec Order], it does not
expressly suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and it is most unlikely that it
could." [ABA Report p.11 analysis].
Also, at this point in the ABA Report: "It remains to be seen what
procedures will be developed and promulgated, but there is no reason these
should not provide due process, even considering the exigencies that
motivated the President's order."
Finally, "The United States is a party to the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights. Article 14 of the ICCPR describes certain
standards and procedures that should be used in all courts and tribunals."
The ABA later backed off a bit, after Ashcroft issued the rules implementing
the Exec. Order--expressing qualified praise, but nevertheless
remaining concerned abt the Exec. Order's suggestion that there will be no
appellate review. See M. Tebo, Qualified Praise: ABA Reps See Things They
Like in Tribunal Rules, [but] Still Have Some Legal Concerns, 88 A.B.A.
Journal 59 (May 2002).
Hope this helps,
From: Mark Tushnet
To: conlawprof at listserv.ucla.edu; fedcourts at law.wisc.edu;
civpro at law.wisc.edu; David Cole
Sent: 6/11/02 5:45 AM
Subject: [civpro] Thinking about detention [with apologies for cross
I've been trying to figure out how to think about the legal status of Al
Mujahir/Padilla. Here are some quite preliminary thoughts.
1. Because, as I understand it, as a U.S. citizen, he is not within the
jurisdiction of the military tribunals (and therefore the reference in
Ex parte Quirin to unlawful combatants is irrelevant), what appears to
be at stake is the detention of a U.S. citizen by the U.S. military on
U.S. soil, without any judicial order authorizing the detention. This
seems to me the classic case for which habeas corpus was intended, to
test the legality of the detention.
2. If the government's position is that the detention need not be
authorized (or found lawful) by a court, this is a suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the relevant cases are Ex
parte Milligan and Duncan v. Kahanamoku.
3. Because the civil courts are open, there's a prima facie problem
with the detention understood as a suspension of the writ. (This
morning's paper contains a suggestion by Ruth Wedgwood that the
detention is similar to those by Union forces of Confederate soldiers.
My understanding, which could be corrected by those with more knowledge,
is that the POW camps for Confederate soldiers were in the states of the
South -- e.g., Andersonville -- where the civil courts were not open.
Does anyone know whether there were POW camps for Confederates in Union
states, or whether camps in the South were maintained after the civil
courts reopened [itself, I would think, a tricky question, given the
military dimensions of Reconstruction]?).
4. The first question with respect to a suspension of the writ is
whether any statute authorizes the president to suspend the writ. Next,
is a "suspension" targeted at a single individual permissible when a
generalized suspension would not be? Finally, does the president have
inherent authority -- as commander-in-chief, or otherwise -- to suspend
the writ as to an individual, even without congressional authorization?
(I take it that the last two questions are the reason that President
Bush personally authorized the transfer to military jurisdiction.)
5. Finally, assuming that the administration's position is that habeas
corpus remains available to test the legality of the detention and that
the detention is legal, what's the analysis? (The relevant cases here
would seem to be ones dealing with preventive detention in a criminal
context, but I don't know those cases well enough to know what to think
about their extension to the present context.)
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