Virulent criticism of Islam online legally actionable?

[Eugene Volokh]

        Might I ask for a bit more details on this?  As I read 47 USC sec. 223(e),
it only immunized ISPs for liability under subsections (a) and (d), which
generally dealt with threats, obscene communications, and communications of
sexually themed material to minors.  What's more, sec. 223(h)(1)(B) and sec.
223(h)(2) don't seem to me to say much about whether ISPs are common
carriers for purposes of other provisions of the Communications Act; sec.
223(f) seems to me to be likewise unhelpful; and sec. 223(g) specifically
makes clear that sec. 223(f) does *not* preempt any federal law.  See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=47&sec=223 .  Am I
missing something?

        Eugene

Ken Katkin writes:

> Actually, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 makes clear that
> even where an Internet
> user posts unlawful material on the Internet, there can be no
> *Communications Act*
> cause of action against an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
> "solely for providing
> access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network
> not under [the ISP's]
> control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate
> storage, access software,
> [etc.]. . . . "  47 U.S.C. sec. 223(e); see also 47 U.S.C. sec.
> 223(h)(1)(B), (h)(2)
> (clarifying that  an ISP is not a common carrier subject to
> Communications Act
> requirements).  In addition, Section 223(f)(2) preempts all state
> and local tort law
> that might apply against ISPs under these circumstances.   And
> Section 223(f)(1) may
> arguable supersede Title II of the Civil Rights
> Act of 1964, as applied to ISPs in this context.
>
> --Ken Katkin
>
> "Arthur D. Wolf" wrote:
>
> >         Two short observations.  First, would the plaintiffs be
> better off
> > asserting a claim based on the non-discrimination provision in the
> > Communications Act of 1996 (Section 151 of Title 47), which appears to
> > cover both wire and radio transmissions?  Would the plaintiffs have an
> > implied right of action under that statute?
> >
> >         Second, has not the generous reading of "writings" in
> the Constitution's
> > Copyright Clause occurred in the context of a congresssional
> statute that
> > expressly covered photographs and movies?  That is, Congress made the
> > initial judgment to cover other subjects (in addition to "writings").
> > Courts should be reluctant to expand statutory coverage in the
> absence of
> > congressional direction.  After all, Congress could amend Title
> II or enact
> > another statute to cover the internet (so long as it does not infringe
> > First Amendment rights).
> >
> >                         Art Wolf
> >                         Western New England College
> >
> > At 09:35 PM 9/5/2001 -0400, you wrote:
> > >       Michael  may well be correct, but let me ask three questions:
> > >  Might courts conclude that AOL is covered by 42 USC 2000a(b)(1)'s
> > >inclusion of  "    Cf. the way "writings" in the Copyright  Clause have
> > >been applied to photographs and movies, and "speech" and
> "press" has  been
> > >applied to the Internet.          I ask this because the
> threshold question
> > >of  whether an ISP is a place of public accommodation is the same for
> > >discriminatory  service provision claims as for hostile
> environment claims.
> > >        Cf. http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/listener.htm  notes
> > >46-49; the Vermont case discussed in
> > >http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass/cyberspa.htm
> (Note that
> > >the relevant question here would be one of  choice of law, not of
> > >jurisdiction; clearly this district court in Virginia has  jurisdiction
> > >over AOL.)       Eugene   Michael Masinter  writes:   >  a
> > >> public accommodation within the meaning of  Title Two.
> > >
>
> --
> Prof. Ken Katkin
> Salmon P. Chase College of Law
> 561 Nunn Hall
> Northern Kentucky University
> Highland Heights, KY 41099
> (859) 572-5861 phone
> (859) 572-5342 fax
> katkink at nku.edu
>