Anti-abortion exhibit as sexual harassment?

[Michael McConnell]

Thanks to Lynne Henderson for her informative post. But I still find it
difficult to understand the connection between being offended, being
offended on the basis of gender, and being offended discriminatorily.

Lynne writes: The "oversensitive woman" notion--or the humorless
feminist--has been used
by many courts to suggest that *all* or *most* women have to be offended,
and that "ribaldry" in the work place is just something women have to put up
with.  See Susan Estrich *Sex at Work* 43 (?) Stan. L .Rev.  The 9th Circuit
OTOH in an opinion by Koszinski suggests the "reasonable woman"
standard--would the reasonable woman" feel threatened or discriminated
against in a hostile environment case.  *Ellison v. Brady*

Why is "ribaldry in the workplace" something that "women have to put up
with" rather than something -- like unpleasant odors or summer heat -- that
*everyone* has to put up with? Why is "ribaldry" thought to be a
gender-based problem? Is this an empirical observation: that more women than
men object to ribaldry? (If so, this would seem to be a disparate impact
issue.) Or is ribald speech illegal only when the speaker chooses his (or
her) targets on the basis of sex, or perhaps chooses his (or her) subject
matter for the purpose of making people of one particular gender
uncomfortable? (If so, this would seem to be a disparate treatment issue.)
Or is the problem based on the  view (which is controversial, and maybe
wrong) that the subject matter of ribaldry -- sex -- is somehow hostile to
women? (If so, what kind of discrimination theory is this?)

Michael W. McConnell
University of Utah College of Law
332 S. 1400 East Room 102
Salt Lake City, UT 84112