Proposed Constitutional Election Amendment

[Leslie Goldstein]

woops, forgot to append it the last time.  Sorry.  Here it is
(description below in the previous post.)
              The Alternative Vote

              81.   The simplest change would be from FPTP to the
Alternative Vote (henceforth
              referred to as AV). This meets several of our four
criteria. It would fully maintain the link
              between MPs and a single geographical constituency. It
would increase voter choice in the
              sense that it would enable voters to express their second
and sometimes third or fourth
              preferences, and thus free them from a bifurcating choice
between realistic and ideological
              commitment or, as it sometimes is called, voting
tactically. There is not the slightest reason
              to think that AV would reduce the stability of government;
it might indeed lead to larger
              parliamentary majorities. This is a formidable list of
assets, particularly in the context of our
              terms of reference. And there are at least two further
ones. AV would involve no change of
              constituency boundaries, and could thus be implemented
from the moment that Parliament
              accepted a positive vote in a referendum. It would also
virtually ensure that each MP
              commanded at least majority acquiescence within his
constituency, which is far from being
              the case under FPTP, where as we have seen nearly a half
of members have more
              opponents than supporters, and, exceptionally, a member
can be elected (as in Inverness in
              1992) with as little as 26% of the vote. However, it is
necessary to acknowledge the
              argument that the second or subsequent preferences of a
losing candidate, if they are
              decisive, are seen by some as carrying less value (and
even as arising almost accidentally)
              and so contributing less to the legitimacy of the result,
than first preference votes (or indeed
              the second preferences of the most powerful candidates).

              82.   Beyond this AV on its own suffers from a stark
objection. It offers little prospect of a
              move towards greater proportionality, and in some
circumstances, and those the ones
              which certainly prevailed at the last election and may
well do so for at least the next one, it
              is even less proportional that FPTP. Simulations of how
the 1997 result might have come
              out under AV suggest that it would have significantly
increased the size of the already
              swollen Labour majority. A 'best guess' projection of the
shape of the current Parliament
              under AV suggests on one highly reputable estimate the
following outcome with the actual
              FPTP figures given in brackets after the projected
figures: Labour 452 (419), Conservative
              96 (165), Liberal Democrats 82 (46), others 29 (29). The
overall Labour majority could
              thus have risen from 169 to 245. On another equally
reputable estimate the figures are
              given as Labour 436, Conservatives 110, Liberal Democrats
84 and others 29, an overall
              majority this time of 213. On either basis an injustice to
the Liberal Democrats would have
              been nearly two-thirds corrected (their strictly
proportional entitlement was 111 seats) but
              at the price of a still greater injustice to the
Conservatives. The Conservative 30.7% of the
              votes should strictly have given them 202 seats. Instead
FPTP gave them 165 or 25% of
              the seats, whereas AV would have given them on one
estimate only 96 (or 14.6% of the
              seats), and on the more favourable one from their point of
view 110 seats (or 16.7% of the
              total).

              83.   The 1997 election, it can be argued, was far from
typical. The scenario was the one
              most calculated to produce an exaggerated majority and to
increase disproportionality.
              There was a strong desire to get rid of the incumbent
government, the third party (Liberal
              Democrats) was much closer to the main Labour challenger
than to the government, and
              many voters cared more about casting an anti-Conservative
vote than about whether this
              would result in a Labour or a Liberal Democrat victory in
their particular constituency.
              (This last factor, however, did not clearly add to the
difference between a FPTP and an
              AV result, for many electors did a sort of 'do it
yourself' AV and voted for whichever of
              the two opposition candidates they thought was the more
effective challenger.) In the three
              previous elections, those of 1983, 1987 and 1992, AV would
have had a less distorting
              effect on proportionality between the two main parties.
For example, one estimate suggests
              that it would have led to a Conservative majority (with
the actual FPTP result again given in
              brackets) of 27 (21) in 1992. But it would have avoided
this distortion at the expense of
              being able to claim much less credit for correcting the
adverse treatment of the third party.
              The Liberal Democrats would in 1992 have got only 31 or
4.8% of the seats for 19% of
              the vote.

              84.   Added to this, AV on its own, because it makes use
exclusively of single-member
              constituencies, would fail to address several of the more
significant defects of FPTP which
              we identified earlier. In particular, there would still be
large tracts of the country which
              would be electoral deserts for major parties. Conservative
voters in Scotland, for example,
              might only hope to influence the result through their
second choice. And although AV
              would probably increase the number of marginal seats thus
reducing the number of voters
              effectively excluded from influencing the overall result,
most seats in the country would
              remain safe.

              85.   The Commission's conclusions from these and other
pieces of evidence about the
              operation of AV are threefold. First, it does not address
one of our most important terms
              of reference. So far from doing much to relieve
disproportionality, it is capable of
              substantially adding to it. Second, its effects (on its
own without any corrective mechanism)
              are disturbingly unpredictable. Third, it would in the
circumstances of the last election,
              which even if untypical is necessarily the one most vivid
in the recollection of the public, and
              very likely in the circumstances of the next one too, be
unacceptably unfair to the
              Conservatives. Fairness in representation is a complex
concept, as we have seen in
              paragraph 6, and one to which the upholders of FPTP do not
appear to attach great
              importance. But it is one which, apart from anything else,
inhibits a Commission appointed
              by a Labour government and presided over by a Liberal
Democrat from recommending a
              solution which at the last election might have left the
Conservatives with less than half of
              their proportional entitlement. We therefore reject the AV
as on its own a solution despite
              what many see as its very considerable advantage of
ensuring that every constituency
              member gains majority acquiescence.

Leslie Goldstein wrote:
>
> I have copied out for others the part of the report that discusses what this
> list has been calling instant runoff.  The report calls it "Alternative
> Voting"  (The FPTP referred to in the report is "first past the post"--i.e.
> our single-member district, winner-take-all system).  Note that the report
> seems quite favorable to AV , especially in the terms we have been
> discussing--i.e. it would enhance the size of the majority count fo rthe
> winner , which amond us has been perceived as a good (altho the Brits
> disparage it).
> LFG
>
> Pamela Karlan wrote:
>
> > For people interested in instant runoffs, you might want to check out
> > http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/contents.htm, which
> > is the British Independent Commission on the Voting System's report.  It's
> > a pretty comprehensive and accessible document.
> >
> > Pam Karlan
> >
> > Pamela S. Karlan
> > Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law
> > Stanford Law School
> > 559 Nathan Abbott Way
> > Stanford, CA 94305-8610
> > karlan at stanford.edu
> > 650.725.4851/725.0253 (fax)