Reno v. Condon

[Ana Stephens]

I am not so sure Condon was an "easy" case.  I think it was "easy" only because
Justice Rehnquist made it easy -- i.e., he asserted the statute was one of
general applicability.  But I am hard-pressed to find any other entity (other
than a state) who operates a DMV.  The private conduct regulated in Condon was
only incidental to the regulation of DMV behavior-- the main focus of the
statute.  Perhaps the Court came out as it did because it considered the statute
to be insignificant.  Of course, we can rationalize the result in Condon by
defining "commandeering" very narrowly.  But as Art points out, it would not
have been inconsistent for the Court to strike down the DPPA on Tenth Amendment
grounds.  The point is that we are still not quite sure what is it that offends
the Tenth Amendment and the state sovereignty entitlement.

Art makes a good point with respect to Testa.  But is Testa still good law after
Alden?

Michael McConnell wrote:

> IN my opinion, the distiction between Reno and New YOrk/Printz is pretty
> easy to see. According to New YOrk/Printiz, Congress has the authority to
> regulate commerce, even when engaged in by states, so long as states are not
> singled out for special prohibitions; but it does not have the authority to
> force states to pass laws (New YOrk) or enforce them (Printz). IN Reno v.
> Condon, Congress prohibited the sale of certain information. That is a
> regulation of commerce; it is enforced by the federal government the same
> way any other commerce clause regulations are enforced; and it does not
> single out states. Easy case, correctly decided.
>
> Michael McConnell
> University of Utah College of Law
> 332 South 1400 East Rm. 101
> Salt Lake City, UT 84112
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Eric Segall [mailto:lawees at PANTHER.GSU.EDU]
> > Sent: Monday, October 16, 2000 2:21 PM
> > To: CONLAWPROF at listserv.ucla.edu
> > Subject: Re: Reno v. Condon
> >
> >
> > Even if the distinctions you mention are persuasive (I'm somewhat
> > skeptical), why would the conservatives work so hard to
> > distinguish Printz
> > and New York? Is there something going on here outside the
> > pure doctrinal
> > development?
> >
> > At 03:36 PM 10/16/00 -0400, Ken Katkin wrote:
> > >I just taught that case this morning to my Con Law I
> > students, and they
> > >certainly shared your puzzlement.   In explaining the
> > distinction from New
> > >York and Printz, I relied on Evan Caminker's distinction:  that the
> > >Drivers Privacy Protection Act at issue in Condon "merely
> > restrains state
> > >action" while the federal statutes at issue in New York and
> > Printz "impose
> > >affirmative obligations on state officials."  See Evan
> > Caminker, Printz,
> > >State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 S. Ct.
> > Review 199,
> > >200 n.6 (1998) (discussing district court holding in Condon).   This
> > >distinction needs to be applied with some functionalistic
> > common sense,
> > >because the Condon court did find that the Drivers Privacy
> > Protection Act
> > >placed an "affirmative obligation" on state DMV officials to
> > learn the
> > >rules about what data they could not sell.  But given that this
> > >"obligation" was apparently too de minimis to trouble the
> > court, Prof.
> > >Caminker's distinction works nicely.
> > >
> > >In addition, the Condon court itself hinted at a second possible
> > >distinction:  that the unconstitutional provisions of the statutes at
> > >issue in New York and Printz applied ONLY to States, while the
> > >restrictions on dissemination of motor vehicle information
> > set forth in
> > >the Drivers Privacy Protection Act applied to non-State
> > owners of such
> > >data, as well (e.g. insurance companies, auto dealers and
> > manufacturers,
> > >etc.).  In discusssing this issue, the Condon court raised
> > the possibility
> > >(also alluded to in Printz's discussion of Garcia) that a
> > law which might
> > >be constitututionally applied to States and private actors
> > alike might be
> > >unconstitutional if applied only to States.  However,
> > because the Drivers
> > >Privacy Protection Act was construed to be generally
> > applicable to both
> > >State and private actors, the Court's dicta on this point is
> > inconclusive
> > >at best.
> > >
> > >Eric Segall wrote:
> > >>I'm not sure if Reno v. Condon has been discussed before on
> > this list but I
> > >>am having a hard time distinguishing it from New York and
> > Printz and need
> > >>help.  It seems like the federal government was telling
> > South Carolina what
> > >>it could and could not do with its DMV information and
> > requiring South
> > >>Carolina to implement federal regulations vis a vis private
> > purchasers of
> > >>that information. Why isn't that commandeering? The opinion
> > is very short
> > >>and unhelpful. Any assistance would be appreciated.
> > >
> > >--
> > >Prof. Ken Katkin
> > >Salmon P. Chase College of Law
> > >561 Nunn Hall
> > >Northern Kentucky University
> > >Highland Heights, KY 41099
> > >(859) 572-5861 phone
> > >(859) 572-5342 fax
> > >katkink at nku.edu
> > >
> >
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